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"History is a fragment of biology-the human moment in the pageant of
species."'
An arrest is not a medical procedure and probable cause is not consent,
and yet for purposes of genetic sampling they have become so. The Consti-
tution considers people to be information containers with rights. And for the
most part, the confiscation of a person's genome in the stationhouse is a
search. But the Supreme Court seems to parse constitutional privacy be-
tween data that originates from within (biologics) and data stored without
(technology). Relying on the history of identification metrics, the necessity
of stationhouse identification and the rationale of custodial control, the
Court has lowered the threshold of biological privacy at arrest. In contrast
to the low esteem in which privacy interests in the human genome seem to
be held, there is a societal, even global, consensus building over the protec-
tion of privacy in digital data, such as the right to be forgotten.2 Today, the
right to privacy in ourselves and in our machines are at loggerheads due in
large part to the Supreme Court's perceptions of privacy, probable cause
and personhood.
When the Constitution was written, information was captured with the
shutter speed of a painter's eye.3 Today, as much privacy as might have
'Will & Ariel Durant, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: PART VIII, THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV 365 (1963).
Even as a subset of biology, history has been marked by the endless struggle over the custody of human
life-covering the spectrum from slavery, trafficking, servitude and imprisonment to absolute freedom
of body and mind. Compare WALK FREE FOUND., THE GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX (2014), with TOWARDS
A WORLDWIDE INDEX OF HUMAN FREEDOM (Fred McMahon, ed., Fraser Inst. 2012). And in the Infor-
mation Age, this struggle includes custodial surveillance through genetic sampling, electronic tracking
and digital monitoring. See generally William P. Ruger & Jason Sorens, Freedom in the 50 States: An
Index of Personal and Economic Freedom, GEORGE MASON UNIV. MERCATUS CTR., http://freedomin
the50states.org/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (including references to DNA test-on-arrest laws throughout).
2 See Factsheet on the "Right to be Forgotten" Ruling (C-131/12), European Commission (2014) availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data protection/files/factsheets/factsheet data protection en.pdf; Kate
Murphy, We Want Privacy, but Can't Stop Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2014, at SR4.
3 There is a famous unfinished painting depicting a meeting between American and British representa-
tives at the close of the Revolutionary War entitled "The American Peace Commissioners," with only
the outlines of the British. "Benjamin West's painting of the preliminary peace negotiations was unfin-
ished because the British Commissioners, who were to be on the right, refused to pose." See Robert G.
Athearn, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE NEW ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME 3,
THE REVOLUTION 257 (Am. Heritage ed. 1963). This suggests the fantastically slow pace at which in-
formation was captured in the era when the Constitution was written. It would be unimaginable today to
take a picture with a piece missing. Indeed, the modern digital photographer can take in information
beyond the visual-cognitive threshold. Still, it is worth noting that as far as we have come technological-
ly, criminal justice keeps one foot in the past where human perception holds sway. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Williams & Sue Russell, THE ILLUSTRATED COURTROOM: 50 YEARS OF COURT ART, (2014) (courtroom
2
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been protected by the Fourth Amendment can be gleaned from a momen-
tary cheek swab.4 Perhaps the induction of medical science and information
technology into law enforcement came too fast too soon, before the law had
a chance to catch its breath.' Of late, genetic identification of arrestees has
again pitted the logic of law against the understanding of science, a lan-
guage spoken by the legal profession with a phrase book.6 But personhood
is permanently diminished when the factory seal on biological privacy is
broken, hence the wisdom behind the warrant requirement. Indeed, warrants
are natural pauses in the swift track of forensic investigation, but the Su-
preme Court's decision in Maryland v. King' has removed that speed bump
and lowered the bar of personhood.
Like DNA, the Fourth Amendment contains a blueprint for human priva-
cy.8 The authors of the Constitution made plain that the security of the"people" is manifested by a right against "unreasonable searches and sei-
zures" of their "persons" (body), "houses" (personal space), "papers" (mem-
ories, thoughts and transactions), and "effects" (things).9 Overall, the Fourth
Amendment, the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments formed a
artistry); J. David Goodman, Fighting Crime with Pencil and Paper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2013, at A14
(sketch artistry).
4 While DNA is the ultimate storage container it has not yet received protections equivalent to electronic
information. See generally Mauricio Castillo, From Hard Drives to Flash Drives to DNA Drives, 35
AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 1 (Apr. 4, 2013); George M. Church et al., Next-Generation Digital Infor-
mation Storage in DNA, 337 SCIENCE 1628 (Sept. 2012); Ken Strutin, DNA and the Double Helix of
Constitutional Rights, 252 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2014) ("DNA is the most compact and enduring of information
media. And technology now permits a life's tale to be written into the fabric of life. As the present and
future host of inestimable personal information, human DNA at a minimum ought to be entitled to the
full range of constitutional protections afforded inorganic data formats." (footnote onitted)).
5 See Adam Lamparello & Charles MacLean, Riley v. California: The New Katz or Chimel?, 21 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 19 (2014), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i1/article1.pdf ("In the law enforcement and gov-
emnent surveillance context, technological advances have made it possible to store an individual's
DNA in a national database, and have made it nearly impossible for that same individual to send an
email, download a YouTube video, or transmit a text message without knowing that the government
might be watching-without having the slightest degree of suspicion of criminal behavior.").
6 See generally AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., FORENSIC DNA FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE
PROSECUTOR: BE NOT AFRAID (2003); David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA
Identification Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 129-210 (3rd ed. 2011);
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE HANDBOOK, CHAPTER 1: CELLS AND DNA
(2014); NAT'L INST. OF JUST., DNAFOR THE DEFENSE BAR (2012).
7 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.")
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Vitruvian Man of privacy and personhood within the squared circle of con-
stitutionality.'0
Arrestee gene capture is the latest piece in the identification-investigation
puzzle that already includes faces and bodies (mugshots, showups and
lineups), eyes (color, retina and iris scans), fingertips (fingerprints), body
measurements and markings (height, weight, tattoos, palm prints, foot-
prints), exemplars (handwriting, voice), biologics (blood, urine, saliva, and
hair) and names (aliases). Around the corner, information gathering at arrest
might include the modern digital wallet, compromising everything from
passwords to social media, personal electronic devices and data sources.11
In the name of privacy, people are seeking security measures, including bi-
ometric and behavioral encryption, which will further complicate constitu-
tional analysis.12 But as for biologics, a person's DNA is not self-evidence
of identification, it is one end of an evidentiary link that can only be mean-
ingful once connected to an existing databanked sample or one obtained
from crime scene evidence.13
When the state tinkers with human biology, it tinkers with privacy. There
is a continuum of DNA information that compromises identity and extends
into the entirety of an individual's life. Genetic science is forcing law to
come to terms with a deeper definition of personhood.14 Indeed, DNA sam-
pling has the potential of making anyone a suspect for life and their genetic
code consciousness of guilt. And the new linkage created between DNA ex-
traction and probable cause is a long way from the laws that approved sam-
'o See generally Ken Strutin, DNA, Privacy and Personhood: The Crime of Being Alive, 250 N.Y. L.J. 5
(2013) ("The Bill of Rights is instinct with privacy, the Civil War Amendments with personhood.").
" See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone
From a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125 (2011).
12 See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Finding the Unique in You to Build a Better Password, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2011.
'3 See, e.g., Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz.
2012) (Norris, J., dissenting in part, concurring in result) ("Further, by itself, DNA provides no identify-
ing information; a DNA sample is only useful when it can be compared to a prior DNA sample obtained
from the same person. If the arrestee's DNA is not in a DNA database, there can be no comparison and
thus no verification of identity."); PRESIDENT'S DNA INITIATIVE, IDENTIFYING VICTIMS USING DNA: A
GUIDE FOR FAMILIES 2 (2005) ("To identify the remains of a victim, DNA from remains found at the
disaster or accident site must be matched to DNA known to be from the victim or the victim's relatives.
Thus, it is necessary to collect DNA samples from family members and from personal items or prior
medical specimens from the victim.").
'4 The cells of the body are replaced at different rates over one's lifetime. However, the seemingly per-
manent fixtures in the human schematics are DNA and some parts of the brain. See Nicholas Wade,
Your Body Is Younger Than You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at Fl, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
08/02/science/02cell.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 ("Most molecules in a cell are constantly being re-
placed but the DNA is not."). The metrics of a person, which remain that person throughout their time
on earth whether revealed by scientific discovery or altered by innovation, will require new definitions
of identity, privacy and personhood.
4
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pling upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Formerly, it was crime
scene evidence, post-conviction sampling or investigative collection
through a warrant or court order, but now the arrest for any crime so classi-
fied is sufficient to collect and create the genetic rap sheet of an accused.15
Conflating a warrantless identification procedure with DNA matching,
the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King removed a layer of privacy from
constitutional scrutiny and opened the door to unchecked genetic investiga-
tion. DNA as evidence of identity and guilt has received a presumption of
infallibility that shuts down critical inquiry at the pretrial stage.16 So much
confidence has been invested in DNA's reputation that it has become the
Fogelman by which all other forensics are measured and the tide that raises
all the boats. Indeed, a prosecution can rest on DNA evidence alone. 8
Thus, assailing DNA evidence for any reason reverberates through all foren-
sics.
The Supreme Court succeeded in creating an amalgam of identification
and investigation to justify biological sampling without individualized sus-
picion. At the same time, their reasoning reveals the law's discomfit with
science already demonstrated by the Court's recent decisions in Cavazos v.
Smith, grappling with advances in medical science that undermined shaken
baby syndrome (SBS),19 and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myri-
ad Genetics in which their understanding of the "fine details of molecular
15 See DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT'L INST. FOR JUST. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.nij.gov
/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/pages/collection-from-arrestees.aspx. As of June 2012, twenty-eight
states have enacted test-on-arrest laws; all fifty states have laws requiring DNA sampling for convicted
offenders; and federal laws cover both scenarios. Id.
16 See infra Part II.
'7 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) ("With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no forensic method
has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source."). See generally Bran-
don Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2009); Wrongful Convictions Involving Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science that Were
Later Overturned through DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/D
NA Exonerations Forensic Science.pdf (last updated Feb. 1, 2009).
I" See generally Ken Strutin, Limitations of Forensics as Standalone Evidence of Guilt, 243 N.Y. L.J. 5
(2010).
'" Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011) (reversing grant of habeas petition because Ninth Circuit im-
properly substituted its judgment of expert evidence on cause of infant's death for that of the trial jurors);
id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that since Shirley Ree Smith's 1997 conviction based on
shaken baby evidence [SBS], "[d]oubt has increased in the medical community 'over whether infants
can be fatally injured through shaking alone."'). Five months after the Supreme Court's decision, Gov.
Brown commuted her sentence. See Carol J. Williams, Brown Commutes Sentence of Woman Convicted
of Killing Grandson, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/07/local/la-me-
shaken-baby-clemency-20120407.
20151
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biology" in a DNA patent claim were openly questioned by Justice Scalia.2"
Thus, the Supreme Court's comprehension of DNA questions in general will
filter down to criminal forensics and Fourth Amendment analysis.
DNA science expands the frontiers of information about individuals,
their families, their travels and their humanity, and potentially reveals new
areas of behavior patterns and physical appearance.2 1 Using DNA in law en-
forcement pushes beyond the limits of privacy through surreptitious evi-
dence gathering, test-on-arrest sampling, dragnets and mass databanking.2
Lastly, DNA jurisprudence exposes the dissonance in the Court's under-
standing of science and society, biology and personhood.
From the scientific heights of genetic analysis to the mundane forensic
tasks of collecting and filing biological evidence, DNA proof has become
the modern workhorse of criminal investigations. While fingerprints can be
compared to themselves, DNA databanks are connective tissue that touches
everything human and private. Today, genetic information is being used to
establish identity (arrested, missing, or deceased), familial relationships (pa-
ternity or immigration), crime scene involvement (location, participation)
and public health risks .23 In the criminal arena, DNA sampling, whether for
identification or investigation, casts a pall over all proceedings from sta-
tionhouse booking to setting bail, negotiating a plea, trying a case, imposing
a sentence and ultimately challenging a conviction.24
20 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013).
21 See, e.g., Gautam Naik, To Sketch a Thief: Genes Draw Likeness of Suspect, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2009, at A9, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB123810863649052551 (describing research into tech-
niques such as forensic Phenotyping that might reveal physical traits); Eleonore Pauwels, Leave Me
Your DNA...and I'll 3D-Print Your Face, GUARDIAN, June 1, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/comme
ntisfree/2013/jun/01/dna-art-recreate-faces.
22 For a collection of "research on the law and science of genetic evidence at the pre-conviction stage,"
see Ken Strutin, DNA Evidence: Brave New World, Same Old Problems, LAW LIBRARY RESOURCE
XCHANGE (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.llrx.com/features/dnaevidence.htm.
23 See generally SARA HUSTON KATSANIS, INST. FOR HOMELAND SEC. SOL'NS, HUMAN DNA IDENTITY
TESTING POLICY REPORT 5 (2013) available at http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2012/03/DNA-Policy-
24Jan13 psg-sk.pdf (highlighting significant privacy and forensic practice issues; "The U.S. government
has instituted policies and regulations for use of DNA in missing persons identification, military, immi-
gration, border security, human trafficking, and intercountry adoption.... As U.S. authorities consider
approaches to incorporating DNA profiling into migration procedures, they must tackle the concerns for
(1) retention of specimens; (2) use of stored specimens; (3) security and access to specimens; (4) securi-
ty and access to DNA profiles; and (5) cross-border searching and exchange of profiles.").
24 See Daniel Gaudet, Waiting for John Doe: The Practical and Constitutional Implications of DNA In-
dictments, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADv. 106, 106 (2013); Katharine C. Lester, Affects of Apprendi
v. New Jersey on the Use of DNA Evidence at Sentencing Can DNA Alone Convict of Unadjudicated
Prior Acts?, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 267, 269 (2010).
6
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Databanking of arrestee genetics will have to be carefully examined in
light of concerns over equal protection and racial overrepresentation.25 The
very existence of DNA databases with millions of profiles weighs on law
enforcement and re-enforces stereotypes perpetuated by samples from pre-
dominantly minority races and people living in high crime areas.26 Indeed,
DNA databases will eventually mirror arrestee populations. Currently, up to
four percent of United States citizens could potentially be added to CODIS
and local databases. 21 Of course, the maintenance and expungement of rec-
ords in cases where the arrests do not result in convictions will pose chal-
lenges for DNA sampling as they do now for stop and frisk data. 28 The
speedy development of portable micro-analytics will eventually lead to
DNA field tests as easy and common as breath tests are now. 29 And the tea
leaves of profiling will reveal connections from identification to gender to
family to ancestry to behavioral profiling; and further to third party wit-
nesses, alternate suspects, near matches (suspect relatives) and genetically
identical siblings. Indeed, DNA information is never viewed in isolation but
associated with other database searches that in toto are revealing a new
identification mosaic."
25 See Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United States, 2013, FBI (Fall 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/abo
ut-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/persons-arrestedlpersons-arrested ("In 2013,
68.9 percent of all persons arrested were white, 28.3 percent were black, and the remaining 2.9 percent
were of other races.").
26 See Jonathan Kahn, Race, Genes, and Justice: A Call to Reform the Presentation of Forensic DNA
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 325, 325 (2009); Karen H. Rothenberg & Alice Wang,
Scarlet Gene: Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and Ethnic Stigma, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 343, 344 (2006).
27 This is based on 11.3 million arrests nationally out of a total population of 316 million people. See
Uniform Crime Report, supra note 25 ("Nationwide, law enforcement made an estimated 11,302,102
arrests in 2013."); U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/pop
clock/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014) ("The United States population on July 4, 2013 was: 316,148,990").
28 See e.g., Lino v. City of New York, 101 A.D.3d 552, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (finding arrestees
had standing to challenge NYPD for failure to seal their records upon dismissal and retention of their
information in "stop and frisk database" for possible "future investigations.").
29 See, e.g., Eric Nicholson, Fort Worth Cops Collected "Voluntary" Blood, Saliva Samples During
Lunchtime Roadblock, DALLAS OBSERVER (Nov. 20 2013, 8:30 AM) http://blogs.dallasobserver.co
m/unfairpark/2013/1 1/fort worth roadblock saliva blood.php; Ray Locker & Kendall Breitman, Rapid
DNA Test Could Transform Crime Fight; Aims to Analyze Samples While Suspects Are Still Held, USA
TODAY, Jan. 28, 2014, at IA, available at https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/530abd08-6ff7-4279-
b491-d7bcd99f2b2f/?context=1000516 (discussing new test under development that might analyze DNA
samples in 90 minutes.).
" See generally David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62
(2013) (discussing technology-centered approach to privacy rights); Christina Farr, Can You Trust Fa-
cebook With Your Genetic Code?, VENTURE BEAT (Oct. 7, 2013, 7:30 AM) http://venturebeat.com/2013
/10/07/can-you-trust-facebook-with-your-genetic-code/ (discussing the current atmosphere of self-
publishing and life-logging that has already led people to post their genomic data on Facebook with
reckless abandon.).
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In Part I, this article explores the challenges to privacy, personhood and
probable cause raised by DNA collection as identification sanctioned in
Maryland v. King. Part II considers the presumed infallibility of DNA test-
ing that undergirds the Supreme Court's embracement of genetic identifica-
tion. Lastly, in Part III, this article will try to decipher the Court's Fourth
Amendment logic in denying privacy to the information in human cells but
embracing them in cell phones in Riley v. California."
I. MARYLAND V. KING: A CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS
The legal landscape before the Supreme Court took up Maryland v. King
represented a mixed bag of federal and state interpretations of genetic pri-
vacy at the pre-conviction stage.32 Thus, the Court's decision to hear the
Maryland case was born from a conflict over privacy, science and criminal
procedure.33 Justice Roberts granted a stay of the Maryland judgment to re-
solve the division of authority and mindful of the global impact of DNA
databanking:
The split implicates an important feature of day-to-day law enforcement prac-
tice in approximately half the States and the Federal Government .... Because
the DNA samples Maryland collects may otherwise be eligible for the FBI's na-
tional DNA database, the decision renders the database less effective for other
States and the Federal Government.3 4
Implicit in this decision is the reality that the trials of tomorrow will be liti-
gated in the databases being created today.
A. The Majority
The identification at the center of Maryland v. King had two starting
points and as it turned out two purposes. In 2003, an unknown man entered
3 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
32 See generally NAT'L INST. FOR JUST., DNA FOR THE DEFENSE BAR, supra note 6; JULIE E. SAMUELS
ET AL., URBAN INST., COLLECTING DNA AT ARREST: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND IMPLICATIONS, FINAL
TECHNICAL REPORT (May 2013); DNA Collection Upon Arrest, NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SCIENCE,
TECH. & L. (May 2011), http://www.ncstl.org/resources/DNACollectionUponArrest (last visited Feb. 2,
2015); DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, supra note 15; State Laws Pertaining to Surreptitious
DNA Testing, GENETICS & PUBLIC POLICY CTR., http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State law summ
aries final all states.pdf (last updated Jan. 21, 2009).
33 See generally David H. Kaye, On the "Considered Analysis" of Collecting DNA Before Conviction,
60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE. 104 (2013) (arguing for a "fully considered analysis" of Maryland v.
King by the Supreme Court).
34 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1, 2-3 (2012).
8
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a Maryland woman's home armed with a gun and raped her.15 No one was
apprehended based on the description.36 However, the unknown offender's
DNA had been harvested. In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested for felony
assault, menacing people with a shotgun.38 Due to the seriousness of the of-
fense, he qualified for DNA sampling under the Maryland DNA Collection
Act, i.e., a buccal swab performed during booking.3 9 This genetic infor-
mation was later connected to the unknown sample from the 2003 rape.40
Mr. King was then charged with the rape offense and convicted at trial.41
The Maryland appeals court overturned the conviction because the DNA
sample was the product of an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.42
According to the timeline, Mr. King was arrested for assault on July 13,
2009, his DNA sample was posted to the state database and a match made
to the 2003 evidence on August 4, 2009, three weeks later.43 This first sam-
ple led to an indictment on the rape charge; another buccal swab was ac-
quired with a search warrant for trial.44 The defendant's Fourth Amendment
challenge to the state's DNA Collection Act was denied by the trial judge.45
Following his conviction, Mr. King was sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. 46 Relying on decisions from other jurisdictions in-
validating arrestee sampling, the state appeals court declared that the appli-
cable sections of the Collection Act were unconstitutional.4 In essence, the
defendant's expectation of privacy exceeded Maryland's interest in using his
5 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013).
36 Id.
37 Id.
31 Id. The 2009 assault case was disposed of through an Alford plea to second-degree assault- a misde-
meanor-while the first-degree assault charge was nolle prosequi. The defendant was sentenced to four
years of incarceration, all but one suspended. State v. King, No. 22K09000428 (Md. Cir. Ct., Wicomico
Cnty., Sept. 16, 2009), http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiryDetail.jis?caseld=22K090004
28&loc=48&detailLoc=K.
31 King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965-66 (2013).
41 Id. at 1966. When the 2009 arrest sample red flagged the 2003 case, a search warrant was obtained for
another DNA profile for the new trial. Id. In practice, the genetic identification for a qualifying arrest
that produced a profile and a match became probable cause for a search warrant in the cold case.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1965-66.
43 Id. at 1966.
44 Id.; see George L. Blum, Annotation, Sufficiency of Search Warrant for DNA Sample, 93 A.L.R. 6th
275 (2014).
45 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1966.
46 Id.
47 Id.
20151
9
Strutin: DNA without Warrant: Decoding Privacy, Probable Cause and Personh
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2014
328 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iii
DNA to identify him. 8 And due to the conflict of authority on this issue
across the country, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.49
Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, began with high praise for fo-
rensic DNA testing:
The advent of DNA technology is one of the most significant scientific ad-
vancements of our era. The full potential for use of genetic markers in medicine
and science is still being explored, but the utility of DNA identification in the
criminal justice system is already undisputed. Since the first use of forensic
DNA analysis to catch a rapist and murderer in England in 1986, (citation omit-
ted), law enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts have acknowledged DNA
testing's "unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to
identify the guilty."5
Then the discussion turned to a historical and contemporary understanding
of nuclear DNA analysis, and the all-important coding and noncoding dis-
tinctions.'" According to the Court the noncoding section or junk DNA was
unrevealing but useful for identification purposes. 52 Again, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the ability of DNA analysis to provide matches with "near cer-
U51tainty".
The Court then delved into the procedural requirements and protections
under state law. 54 The Maryland Act limited arrestee sampling to violent
crimes and burglary. Unacknowledged by the Court was the potential for
mission creep from statutes, which today are confined to violent offenses or
felonies but will soon spread to minor crimes not to mention unregulated
precinct databanking of unconvicted suspects, victims and others.56 This is
48 Id.; see King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 555-56 (Md. 2012) ("We hold that § 2-504(a)(3) of the Maryland
DNA Collection Act, which allows DNA collection from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, for
crimes of violence and burglary, is unconstitutional, under the Fourth Amendment totality of the circum-
stances balancing test, as applied to the relevant facts of this case because King's expectation of privacy
is greater than the State's purported interest in using King's DNA to identify him for purposes of his 10
April 2009 arrest on the assault charges.").
41 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966.
50 id.
51 Id. at 1966-67.
52 Id. at 1967.
51 Id. (citing Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (re-
fusing to recognize a freestanding right to post-conviction DNA testing on Constitutional grounds)).
54 Maryland's statute is not a national model, there are significant variations in coverage and safeguards
among the states that allow for arrestee DNA testing. See generally Brian Clark Stuart, Dethroning
King: Why the Warrantless DNA Testing of Arrestees Should Be Prohibited Under State Constitutions,
83 Miss. L.J. 1111, 1116 n.38 (2014) (containing an Appendix with a survey of DNA test-on-arrest
laws).
55 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967.
56 See Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013,
at Al ("These local databases operate under their own rules, providing the police much more leeway
10
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exceedingly important in light of the continuing parallel collection of digital
data by law enforcement.
According to the Maryland statute, the DNA sample could not be pro-
cessed or uploaded to any database until after arraignment, unless consented
to.58 This was an important step where a judicial officer had the opportunity
to determine the existence of probable cause for the arrest and the fate of
the DNA sample. 9 Moreover, the law limited information gathering to
identification only.60 Indeed, this was one of the embargos that carried a
criminal sanction if violated: "A person may not willfully test a DNA sam-
ple for information that does not relate to the identification of individuals as
specified in this subtitle.' '61 It also prohibited familial database searches for
criminal investigation.62 These are important qualifiers for understanding
the purposes of arrestee sampling and profiling.
The Court observed that the officers had met the statutory requirements
when taking the sample, which put aside any objections on technical
than state and federal regulations. And the police sometimes collect samples from far more than those
convicted of or arrested for serious offenses - in some cases, innocent victims of crimes who do not
necessarily realize their DNA will be saved for future searches."); see also United States v. Davis, 690
F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. den., Davis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 52 (2013) (addressing victim-
offender DNA sample retention); Jeffrey Hess, All Things Considered, Miss. Turns to Cord Blood to
Track Down Statutory Rapists, NPR (June 3, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/06/03/188
423215/miss-turns-to-cord-blood-to-track-down-statutory-rapists. See generally Candice Roman-Santos,
Concerns Associated with Expanding DNA Databases, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J., 267, 295-98
(2011) (discussing "function creep").
" See discussion infra Part III; cf G.W. Schulz, Virginia Police Have Been Secretively Stockpiling Pri-
vate Phone Records, WIRED (Oct. 20, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/virginia-police-
secretively-stockpiling-private-phone-records/ ("In the case of the Virginia database, it's unclear wheth-
er content from seized cellphones-such as text messages- is included in the database or if it just con-
tains so-called metadata describing the phone numbers called, the calls received and their date and dura-
tion. ").
58 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(1) (West 2009). In a sense,
test-on-arrest statutes borrow an individual's privacy unless or until it bears fruit as probable cause for a
new arrest in a cold case or as factor in granting bail or some other law enforcement purpose. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (c)(1)(A) (2012) (codifying the authority to collect DNA sample from arrestees as
condition of release pursuant to DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §
14135a(3)). Compare United States. v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), reh 'g en banc, 646 F.3d 659
(2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (2011) (holding the federal statute requiring DNA as condition of
release was a valid identification method outweighing defendant's privacy interest under Fourth
Amendment), with United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Nevada's decision to
test Scott for drugs without probable cause [as condition of release] does not pass constitutional muster
under any of the three [Fourth Amendment] approaches: consent, special needs or totality of the circum-
stances.").
" 133 S. Ct. at 1967. If no probable cause is found the sample should be destroyed. See § 2-504(d)(2)(i).
60 133 S. Ct. at 1967; see § 2-505(b)(1) ("Only DNA records that directly relate to the identification of
individuals shall be collected and stored.").
61 133 S. Ct. at 1967; see § 2-512(c).
62 133 S. Ct. at 1967; see § 2-506(d).
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grounds. 63 The police took a buccal swab from inside King's cheek, which
the Court termed as minimally invasive and harmless. 64 The majority's fo-
cus on the slightness of the physical intrusion is seemingly at odds with
their interdictions in cases where technology measured human heat signa-
tures and recorded movements over time via Global-Positioning-System
(GPS). 65 Pain free should not equal privacy free. In light of the overwhelm-
ing quantity of personal data that technology can reveal, the invasiveness
test might no longer be efficacious as the line for reasonableness.66
Justice Kennedy further explained that the collection and storage of DNA
profiles was superintended and standardized by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation through the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).6 The
CODIS is the warehouse and database for all fifty states' collection activi-
ties, which includes samples taken from arrestees, convicts and crime
63 133 S. Ct. at 1967. The actual obtention of genetic material, adherence to the statute, forensic proto-
cols, laboratory practices, and the risks of cross-contamination and human error and biases are among
the less superlative aspects of DNA testing. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the Microscope
After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudulent Results, ABA J., Sept. 1, 2013, available at http://ww
w.abajournal.com/magazine/article/crime labs under the microscope after a string of shoddy suspe
ct and fraudu/ (discussing New York City medical examiner's office reviewing over 800 rape cases
covering a 10-year period due to concerns that "DNA evidence may have been mishandled by a lab
technician who resigned in 2011 after an internal review uncovered problems with her work .... The
review [about half done] uncovered 19 cases in which DNA evidence was commingled with DNA evi-
dence from other cases."); Rocco LaDuca, DNA Not Always the Magic Bullet in Crime Investigations,
UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 2012, http://www.uticaod.com/article/20121125/News/31125996
0 ("A lot of people think that if you get a DNA hit that, 'Bingo, you got the person,' but it doesn't work
that way, Oneida County [New York] District Attorney Scott McNamara said. What law enforcement
needs to be cognizant of is that there are many innocent explanations for things to be where they are, and
as we get better and better at being able to find DNA, we also have to keep in mind that there is an inno-
cent way for DNA to be left behind."); Osagie K. Obasogie, High Tech, High Risk Forensics, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2013, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/opinion/high-tech-high-
risk-forensics.html?ref=opinion& r=0 (stating innocent man's DNA found on murder victim's body was
accidentally transferred).
64 133 S. Ct. at 1967-68. They did not consider the scenarios when force must be used because someone
refused to surrender their genetic material. Contrariwise, in those states without test-on-arrest laws,
samples might be extorted as leverage in a plea bargain or a condition of bail. See, e.g., Elizabeth Jones
& Wallace Wade, "Spit and Acquit": Legal and Practical Ramifications of the DA's DNA Gathering
Program, ORANGE COUNTY LAW, Sept. 2009, at 18 ("The newest bargaining chip being offered by the
Orange County District Attorney is the reduction of charges, or an outright dismissal, in exchange for an
oral DNA swab ("buccal swab").").
65 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (finding that four week GPS surveillance of defend-
ant's vehicle violated Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that
surveillance by thermal imaging technology "not in general public use" to reveal heat signatures in pri-
vate home violated Fourth Amendment). See generally Ken Strutin, Mosaic Theory: A New Perspective
for Human Privacy, 250 N.Y. L.J. 5, 7 (2013) ("Thus, every kind of superinformation search, such as
GPS monitoring or DNA databanking, yields a mosaic, a sui generis type of surveillance that is material-
ly different from earlier practices. And the information thus gathered, such as the thousands of pages of
data in Jones, can be archived, mined and shared.").
66 See discussion infra Part III.
67 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013).
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scenes.68 They rely on a 13 loci matching from noncoding DNA segments,
which they claim makes for "extreme accuracy" in comparing samples for
identification. 69 Considering that twenty-eight states have test-on-arrest
laws, the Court expected that its holding apropos Maryland's law would
have national repercussions.
Concededly, a buccal swab was a search under the Fourth Amendment. 1
And the reasonableness of a body search was linked to its intrusiveness,
which in this case was negligible. 2 According to the majority, the Fourth
Amendment was a bulwark against unmerited or improper intrusions, not
all intrusions.7' The reasonableness standard demanded a predicate of some
"individualized suspicion". 7 Thus, warrantless searches gain validity as
state interests become paramount and public interests decline; where the
person is on notice; and when there is little discretion in the act of acquisi-
tion, such as during a booking procedure.75 Under these discretionless cir-
cumstances, reasonableness governed Fourth Amendment analysis, not in-
dividualized suspicion. 6 In King, DNA sampling did not involve judgments
by the processing officers, forestalling any competing interests, and left lit-
tle for a magistrate to review. Holding a suspect in custody after a valid
arrest based on probable cause met this threshold. In this DNA scenario,
privacy interests and law enforcement interests had to be weighed against
each other to assess the reasonableness of taking buccal swabs from ar-
restees. v
The Maryland Act expressed the state's interest in processing and identi-
fying persons and property taken into custody by the police. Probable
cause for arrest laid the foundation for detention and booking, which en-
compassed a search of the person incident to the arrest and stationhouse
processing. 80 Custom and precedent acknowledged the constitutional seal of
68 Id. See generally Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA
Index System (FBI), FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
69 133 S. Ct. at 1968.
o Id. ("At issue is a standard, expanding technology already in widespread use throughout the Nation.").
7' Id. at 1968-69.
72 Id. at 1969.
73 Id.
74 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1969.
7 Id. at 1969-70.
76 Id. at 1970.
77 Id.
78 Id.
71 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970.
8 Id. at 1970-71.
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approval on searches connected with arrest and processing absent individu-
alized suspicion.8 ' Thus, probable cause and administrative process cast a
long shadow. 2 Notably, this logic applied to human beings, not their tech-
nology. 3
For the majority the central concern was harvesting information that con-
firmed identity. 4 After all, due process depended on arresting and trying the
correct suspect in order to assign personal guilt and responsibility. Thus,
Justice Kennedy elaborated on the forms and finitude of identification in the
stationhouse:
An individual's identity is more than just his name or Social Security number,
and the government's interest in identification goes beyond ensuring that the
proper name is typed on the indictment. Identity has never been considered lim-
ited to the name on the arrestee's birth certificate. In fact, a name is of little val-
ue compared to the real interest in identification at stake when an individual is
brought into custody.8 5
To which he added concerns over arrestees who might try to hide their
name or change their appearance to avoid prosecution. 6
Lastly, he assailed the quality of criminal histories generated by the state,
which might not provide correct or complete details.8 Indeed, DNA sam-
pling was essential to close this information gap. In other words, a person
was more than their name; they were every contact with the justice system,
every crime they have been accused of, and every conviction registered by
the state.8 8 And as the King decision will demonstrate, people are also iden-
tified by every uncharged offense to which they might be forensically
linked. Indeed, the majority makes the point that identifying information
81Id. at 1971.
82 Id. ("When probable cause exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society and
hold him in legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those interests.").
83 See infra Part Ill.
84 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970.
85 Id. at 1971.
86 Id. Impersonation, identity theft, as well as paternity and custody, directly implicate identification as
an element of the offense. However, DNA identification is a different breed of metric from routine
booking procedures, such as fingerprinting, due to their linkage to other unrelated facts like familial
connections and inherent data like genetic diseases or features or predispositions.
87 Id.
88 Id. Expressing a philosophy reminiscent of the "broken windows" theory of crime prevention, Justice
Kennedy focused on the value of knowing the potentiality of arrestees for serious crimes: "It is a com-
mon occurrence that '[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dan-
gerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state
trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killer Joel Rifkin for
the same reason. One of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks was stopped and ticketed for
speeding just two days before hijacking Flight 93."' (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
132 S.Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012)). Id. But is this a "common occurrence"?
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has traditionally been collected for purposes of comparison, e.g., mugshot
with wanted posters or eyewitness descriptions, and of course, the finger-
print database that put side by side arrestees and unsolved cases.89 Once
more, the Court views DNA profiling in line with customary methods like
fingerprinting, differing only in degree.90
The pinnacle of police investigation is identifying, locating, and appre-
hending an exclusive suspect who best fits the facts. To that end, the meth-
ods of identification or confirmation follow a history that has led them into
the age of databases and biologics. Still, the amount of information gar-
nered for this purpose had a natural ceiling, which technology has breached.
The Court equated DNA loci with the whorls and swirls of fingerprints, ex-
alting DNA as "irrefutable identification" judged against the now down-
graded fingerprint.91 Still, Justice Kennedy characterized it as just one more
tool: "DNA is another metric of identification used to connect the arrestee
with his or her public persona, as reflected in records of his or her actions
that are available to the police.' '92 But a CODIS profile is more akin to
someone's Facebook page or cell phone than to a mugshot. 93 For the Court
"complete identity" entailed extraneous details from unsolved cases and un-
charged crimes. 94
Despite the overbroad definition of identity that encompassed uncharged
and unsolved crimes, the Court drew upon additional justifications for elic-
iting an arrestee's genetic profile, such as jail security. The sheriff was enti-
tled to know the "type of person" in their custody to promote smooth ad-
ministration of pretrial detainees.95 This rationale opened the floodgates of
89 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1971-72. The advent of facial recognition databases might raise the photographic
and sketch artist comparisons to a new constitutional level as well. See J. David Goodman, Fighting
Crime With Pencil and Paper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2013, at A14 ("In a technology-obsessed depart-
ment actively pursuing futuristic tools - like a scanner to detect hidden guns or robust facial recogni-
tion software - the sketches still hold sway for the simple reason that, despite their seeming impreci-
sion, detectives still use them to catch suspects.").
90 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1972 ("In this respect the only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted
use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.").
9' Id.
92 Id.
9' See id.; see also Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional
Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REv. 228, 228 (2011); Ken Strutin, Big Data, Little Privacy: Tracking the Usu-
al Suspects, LLRX.CoM (July 21, 2013), http://www.llrx.com/features/dataprivacy.htm; infra Part III;
see, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Facebook Lawsuit Over Search Warrants Can Proceed, a Court in
Manhattan Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, at A24 (discussing Facebook's challenge to search war-
rants issued for the contents of pages belonging to 381 users as part of a fraud investigation).
94 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1972 ("Finding occurrences of the arrestee's CODIS profile in outstanding cases is
consistent with this common practice. It uses a different form of identification than a name or finger-
print, but its function is the same.").
95 Id.
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behavioral profiling beyond the patina of identity, e.g., uncharged, unsolved
crimes; history of violent behavior or "mental disorder"; and possibly rein-
vestigation (reexamining the accuracy of the initial identification).96 Then
of course, the chief purpose of detention was to assure that the defendant
would appear at trial. Thus, risk of flight became a facet of identification,
which would be allayed by a CODIS search for compelling reasons to
flee.98 Finally, anticipating the arraignment, the Court considered danger to
the community in setting bail or terms of release.99 Indeed, this last criterion
broached predictive policing and preventive detention.0 0 The crime preven-
tion aspect that the Court described goes well beyond bail criteria and deep
into warrantless investigation.0 1
The majority cited several crime prevention studies to bolster their point.
In considering laws to require collecting DNA from arrestees, government
agencies around the Nation found evidence of numerous cases in which felony
arrestees would have been identified as violent through DNA identification
matching them to previous crimes but who later committed additional crimes
because such identification was not used to detain them.102
Still, danger to the community is not necessarily a bail criterion in all juris-
dictions.10 3 And the Court's approach bypasses traditional investigative po-
licing that required individualized suspicion and probable cause. But here,
Justice Kennedy was not distinguishing between guilt and innocence, rather
96 Id. ("Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has
a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect
and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in
[certain cases, such as] where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault." (quot-
ing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). Might not this rationale open the
door to retrieving medical or psychiatric records?
97 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1972-73.
98 Id. at 1973 ("A person who is arrested for one offense but knows that he has yet to answer for some
past crime may be more inclined to flee the instant charges, lest continued contact with the criminal jus-
tice system expose one or more other serious offenses."). This sounds like a predicate for consciousness
of guilt based solely on a person's privacy interest in their genome.
99 Id. at 1973; see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). (stating concerns raised by the
Court are not universal, many states do not consider dangerousness or practice preventive detention);
Ken Strutin, Pretrial Detention, Bail and Due Process, LLRX.CoM (July 2, 2011), http://www.llrx.com/
features/pretrialdetention.htm.
... King, S.Ct. 133 at 1972. "Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime based on
DNA identification is especially probative of the court's consideration of 'the danger of the defendant to
the alleged victim, another person, or the community."' Id. at 1973 (citations omitted).
'.' See id. at 1974.
112 Id. at 1973.
"' The concerns raised by the Supreme Court are not universal, many states do not consider dangerous-
ness or practice preventive detention. See generally Ken Strutin, Pretrial Detention, Bail and Due Pro-
cess, LLRX (July 2, 2011), http://www.llrx.com/features/pretrialdetention.htm.Bail - The Purposes of
the Bail or Pretrial Release Decision, JRANK, http://law.jrank.org/pages/556/Bail-purposes-bail-or-
pretrial-release-decision.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
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the focus was on tagging an arrestee as violent, i.e., behavioral profiling.
Conceptually, this approach is not very different from extracting propensity
for violence information from genetics.0 4
All of the above was an extra-constitutional method for creating an en-
hanced rap sheet and preparing the groundwork for prosecuting matched
cold cases. Not only would this impact bail and revocation decisions, it
would potentially encompass pretextual arrests, charge inflation to obtain
samples, and plea bargaining by leveraging CODIS linked cases. 10 5 Not-
withstanding, Justice Kennedy added one last rationale for sampling: it
might liberate the wrongfully convicted in other cases.0 6
Justice Kennedy went on to rationalize genetic sampling as identification
through a review of accepted police methods sanctioned by history, such as
photography (mugshots) and Bertillon body measurements.1 0 ' The over in-
clusion of DNA science as forensic technology is leading to a foreshorten-
ing of privacy.10 8 The Court's point was that a suspect's name alone was in-
sufficient; detailed information was needed to reclaim escapees and produce
important background data about criminal activities and personal histories.
For the most part, these techniques entered the mainstream of criminalistics
without constitutional scrutiny for the most part. Nineteenth Century think-
ing about identification and control of suspects was in lockstep with Nine-
teenth Century technology. Indeed, the fingerprint entered criminal proce-
'04 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973; see also Paul S. Appelbaum, The Double Helix Takes the Witness Stand:
Behavioral and Neuropsychiatric Genetics in Court, 82 NEURON 946, 946 (2014); Patricia Cohen, Ge-
netic Basis for Crime: A New Look, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at Cl, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06
/20/arts/genetics-and-crime-at-institute-of-justice-conference.html. See generally Jari Tiihonen et al.,
Genetic Background of Extreme Violent Behavior, MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY (Oct. 28, 2014), http://ww
w.nature.com/mp/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/mp2014130a.html.
105 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1974.
106 Id.; see Adam Liptak, Cited by a Justice, but Feeling Less Than Honored, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2013, at A15, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/1 1/us/cited-by-a-justice-but-feeling-less-than-honored.h
tml (discussing the misimpressions left by Justices Kennedy and Scalia in their interpretation of DNA
sampling as applied to wrongful conviction and their implications for law enforcement).
'o King, 133 S.Ct. at 1975.
0 The milestones in the scientific study of the human genome were made well over a century ago-
1869 discovery, 1944 role in heredity, 1953 morphology. See Ralf Dahm, Friedrich Miescher and the
Discovery of DNA, 278 DEV. BIOL. 274, 274 (2005); J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Structure for Deoxy-
ribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737, 737 (1953); DNA as the "Stuff of Genes": The Discovery of the
Transforming Principle, 1940-1944, NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED., http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/N
arrative/CC/p-nid/157 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Double Helix: Fifty Years of DNA, NATURE,
http://www.nature.com/nature/dna50/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). Its life as a crime fighting
and identification tool began only a generation ago-1984 forensics, 2009 fabrication. See Dan Frumkin
et al., Authentication of Forensic DNA Samples, 4 FORENSIC. ScI. INT'L.: GENETICS 95, 95 (2009); Nick
Zagorski, Profile ofAlec J. Jeffreys, 103 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 8918, 8919 (2006). And in
that brief time it has become the unsurpassable forensic tool in the eyes of the courts.
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dure without any constitutional fanfare.10 9 It was viewed as another metric,
a natural outgrowth of photography and Bertillon measurements. 01
Common forensic investigative and matching techniques involving fin-
gerprints, firearms, bitemarks, and arson, had earned their reputations be-
fore the onset of DNA exonerations and revision of standards.111 In the face
of recent challenges, courts have upheld these scientifically unvetted tech-
niques based on history and custom, confidence in cross-examination, exal-
tation of precedent over principle, and the availability of experts for the de-
fense.112 Thus, in the name of finality, comity and precedent, one person's
junk science has become another's gold standard.113
Unlike fingerprints, DNA was raised in a laboratory and nurtured by sci-
entists and doctors unconcerned with the aims of criminal procedure. How-
ever, DNA forensics represented a shift in the analysis of evidence and as-
signment of guilt. In Justice Kennedy's view, it made other identification
techniques obsolete: "DNA identification is an advanced technique superior
to fingerprinting in many ways, so much so that to insist on fingerprints as
the norm would make little sense to either the forensic expert or a layper-
'09 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1976. ("In the seminal case of United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932),
Judge Augustus Hand wrote that routine fingerprinting did not violate the Fourth Amendment precisely
because it fit within the accepted means of processing an arrestee into custody.").
"o See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1932).
.. See Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to Develop-
ments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 236, 300 (2013). This article demonstrates the lack of
consistency in the response by federal and state courts to the NAS Report (Strengthening Forensic Sci-
ence in the United States: A Path Forward (National Academy of Sciences 2009)), thus revealing their
struggles with science. In essence, judges and juries are making judgments of scientific truth. And the
results are a body of decisions that reveal compromise and stutter steps in their approaches tounder-
standing about revelatory scientific investigation of time-honored forensic techniques.
112 Id. at 300-01. Another revelation from DNA exonerations is the reciprocal reinforcement of false
confessions by unvetted forensics. Thus, bad science can compound bad investigations. It seems that
adversarial science warps the justice system by perpetuating a narrative of guilt based on precedent, his-
tory, custom and necessity. The theory of the case and the findings of science travel different paths; it is
when they are artificially synthesized that false and inaccurate outcomes are most likely. The factual
scenario of a case ought to be constructed without investigative biases, political necessity pressures to
close cases, and judicial imperatives to punish offenders.
"3 Id. at 301. Prof. Cooper concluded her research with this important observation: "[L]aw must serve as
a way of organizing societies by providing stability and predictability, whereas science is encouraged to
embrace new ideas so that we can better understand the natural world .... Moreover, judges seem ill-
equipped to recognize the distinctions between valid and invalid forensic science. Law remains ill-
equipped to incorporate changes in these disciplines because law is beholden to finality and predictabil-
ity." Id.
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son.' 114 The virtues of DNA were its uniqueness and immutability, insus-
ceptible to plastic surgery or fingerprint erasure. 115
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court struggled with the efficacy of DNA pro-
filing in terms of processing speed, as compared with the swiftness of fin-
gerprint reports, and resolved in favor of its unquestioning acceptance.116
Basically, the majority adopted the fingerprint experience as the model for
recognizing DNA testing.1 1 The fingerprint analogy does carry some
weight in support of genetic identification due its database linkage. Still,
this reasoning points towards the potential of identification plus, the inclu-
sion of any database sources that might address legitimate government in-
terests at the booking and custodial stages, e.g., social media and digital
profiles; medical and psychiatric records.118 This is not a mere "extension"
of existing identification techniques.119
On the other side of the scale the Court weighed Mr. King's expectation
of privacy. First, there had to be a valid arrest; 120 then the reasonableness of
the search had to be evaluated. 121 The Court put weight on the point that
once in custody the accused's expectation of privacy was diminished. 122 A
stationhouse booking was not a programmatic or special needs search, such
as checkpoints or roadblocks, which required justification unrelated to
criminal investigation. 123 Due to the reduced expectation of privacy of ar-
restees, no "special needs" had to be considered. 124 What is more, custodial
... Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1976 (2013). Still, the middle ground of retina and iris scans were
ignored. The Court immediately embraced the most advanced and revelatory identification technique,
which might, in constitutional hindsight, have been excessive and unnecessary.
15 Id.
116 See id. at 1976-77 ("The question of how long it takes to process identifying information obtained
from a valid search goes only to the efficacy of the search for its purpose of prompt identification, not
the constitutionality of the search.").
"7 Id. ("Just as fingerprinting was constitutional for generations prior to the introduction of JAFIS [Inte-
grated Automated Fingerprint Identification System], DNA identification of arrestees is a permissible
tool of law enforcement today.").
1I8 Cf id. at 1977 ("By identifying not only who the arrestee is but also what other available records dis-
close about his past to show who he is, the police can ensure that they have the proper person under ar-
rest and that they have made the necessary arrangements for his custody; and, just as important, they can
also prevent suspicion against or prosecution of the innocent.").
19 But see King, 133 S.Ct. at 1977.201 Id. at 1977-78.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1978 ("The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody 'necessarily [are]
of a diminished scope."' (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)).
123 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1978.
124 Id. ("The special needs cases, though in full accord with the result reached here, do not have a direct
bearing on the issues presented in this case, because unlike the search of a citizen who has not been sus-
pected of a wrong, a detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.").
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searches had limits, such as surgery to remove an incriminating bullet or
rummaging through a suspect's home, essentially warrantless searches that
exceeded Chimel. 125
In the Court's opinion, a buccal swab was brief, harmless and scarcely in-
trusiveness enough to raise an eyebrow. 126 Even so, Justice Kennedy did al-
low for the possibility of changes in science that might warrant privacy pro-
tections: "While science can always progress further, and those
progressions may have Fourth Amendment consequences, alleles at the
CODIS loci 'are not at present revealing information beyond identification.'
(citation omitted). The argument that the testing at issue in this case reveals
any private medical information at all is open to dispute."' 12' According to
the majority, the non-coding or junk DNA was uninformative and current
procedures did not analyze them for any other purpose than identifica-
tion. 1 28 But again, Justice Kennedy left the door open for revisiting the issue
should retention and repurposing become a problem: "If in the future police
analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee's predisposition for a
particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that
case would present additional privacy concerns not present here.' '1 29 Ac-
cording to the Court, the Maryland statute included sufficient safeguards
against information abuse by confining data gathering to identification pur-
poses only. 30
125 See id. at 1979; infra Part III (discussing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
126 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1979 ("A brief intrusion of an arrestee's person is subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment, but a swab of this nature does not increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of
arrest.").
127 id.
128 Id. ("This parallels a similar safeguard based on actual practice in the school drug-testing context,
where the Court deemed it 'significant that the tests at issue here look only for drugs, and not for wheth-
er the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic."' (quoting Vernona Sch. Dist. 47J v. Ac-
ton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995))).
129 Id. Compare United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding, with some
trepidation, that government retention of DNA blood sample obtained as condition of supervised release,
which had been completed, was justified by the need for maintaining accuracy and quality assurance of
CODIS: "We nevertheless recognize that we are dealing with a rapidly changing world in which risks of
undue intrusions on privacy are also changing. We have previously stressed that if scientific discoveries
make clear that junk DNA reveals more about individuals than we have previously understood, we
should reconsider the government's DNA collection programs." Id. at 1147.), with State v. Benefield,
153 Conn. App. 691, 696-98, 707-08 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014), app. den., State v. Benefield, 315 Conn.
913 (2015) (holding that Defendant's consent to buccal saliva swab in 1986 murder investigation was
sufficient to permit DNA testing and matching in 2009: "In summary, the determinative fact in this case
is that the defendant consented to 'a complete search' of his saliva samples without temporal limitation,
and without restriction as to the kinds of tests to be performed." Id. at 707.).
130 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1979-80 ("[T]he Act requires that '[o]nly DNA records that directly relate to the
identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.' No purpose other than identification is per-
20
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The majority used language and custom to reduce arrestee privacy expec-
tations. "Identification" has thus become Supreme Court newspeak for be-
havioral profiling and investigation into cold cases. But there is nothing
routine about taking someone's genome and creating a profile from it as the
dissenters explained.
B. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia held forth on the right to genetic
privacy for arrestees. Their opinion also demonstrated the internal debate
about the limits of scientific knowledge being set by judicial decisions:
The Court's assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve crimes, but to iden-
tify those in the State's custody, taxes the credulity of the credulous. And the
Court's comparison of Maryland's DNA searches to other techniques, such as
fingerprinting, can seem apt only to those who know no more than today's
opinion has chosen to tell them about how those DNA searches actually
work. 13 1
Justice Scalia went on to recall the history of the dreaded general warrant--
"warrants not grounded upon a sworn oath of a specific infraction by a par-
ticular individual, and thus not limited in scope and application.113 2 The
states enacted the Fourth Amendment in response to these abuses.133 More
to the point, the small range of suspicionless or special needs searches was
never meant to cover crime detection or routine law enforcement.134 Thus,
without a justification for a search beyond the discovery of wrongdoing, the
majority's reasonableness inquiry failed. 3 5 For instance, a warrantless
search of an arrestee's home, outside the Chimel line, would be unreasona-
ble. While some courts have recognized that a second analytical search of
missible: 'A person may not willfully test a DNA sample for information that does not relate to the iden-
tification of individuals as specified in this subtitle."') (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
'3' Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 Id.
'33 Id. at 1981 ("As ratified, the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause forbids a warrant to 'issue' except
'upon probable cause,' and requires that it be 'particula[r]' (which is to say, individualized) to 'the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' And we have held that, even when a warrant is
not constitutionally necessary, the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition of 'unreasonable' searches
imports the same requirement of individualized suspicion." (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308
(1997)); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis added)).
'34 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1981-82.
135 See id.
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biologics required a warrant, 13 6 the King majority found that intrusion upon
a person's genetic code was not deserving of the same level of privacy pro-
tection.137
Still, the point of the dissent was that a suspicionless search for crime de-
tection was indefensible. Justice Scalia took the majority to task for their
loose definition of identification that encompassed evidence of unsolved
unrelated crimes.138 And more critically, Justice Scalia noted that the major-
ity did not elaborate on the "actual workings of the DNA search at issue
here."139 This is the crux of modern decision making on constitutional ques-
tions that involve science-wherein does a court's scientific competence
come from, legal reasoning or scientific method, Blackstone or Bacon.
The Maryland statute and procedures delayed testing and processing be-
yond the point that King's name, fingerprints and other identifying infor-
mation would have already been collected.140 According to Justice Scalia,
following the pattern and timeline set out by the Maryland Collection Act
and the majority's interpretation, King's identity had not been completely
confirmed by arraignment-calling into question the state legislature's wis-
dom and clarity of purpose in setting arraignment as the deadline for DNA
profiling.141 In fact, it took months for the profile to be completed by
CODIS. 142
136 See Catherine W. Kimel, DNA Profiles, Computer Searches, and the Fourth Amendment, 62 DUKE
L.J. 933, 968 (2013); see also discussion infra Part III; c.f United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2nd
Cir. 2014) (holding that indefinite retention of personal computer files for future searches amounted to a
"general warrant."). See generally Liz Campbell, A Rights-Based Analysis of DNA Retention: "'Non-
Conviction " Databases and the Liberal State, 12 CRIm. L. REV. 889 (2010) (discussing the human rights
implications of DNA information harvesting without conviction).
" King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980; see Stephanie B. Noronha, Comment, Maryland v. King: Sacrificing the
Fourth Amendment to Build Up the DNA Database, 73 MD. L. REv. 667, 687 (2014).
138 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1982-83 ("If identifying someone means finding out what unsolved crimes he has
committed, then identification is indistinguishable from the ordinary law-enforcement aims that have
never been thought to justify a suspicionless search. Searching every lawfully stopped car, for example,
might turn up information about unsolved crimes the driver had committed, but no one would say that
such a search was aimed at "identifying" him, and no court would hold such a search lawful.").
13' Id. at 1983.
140 Id.
141 Id. "Does the Court really believe that Maryland did not know whom it was arraigning? ... Why
would Maryland resign itself to simply hoping that the bail decision will drag out long enough that the
'identification' can succeed before the arrestee is released?" Id. at 1983-84.
142 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1984. Mr. King was arrested and his DNA sampled on April 10, 2009. The sample
was received by the state police forensic division on April 23rd. It was then mailed to the state laborato-
ry on June 25th. The analysis report was issued on July 13th at which time it was uploaded to the state
DNA database along with Mr. King's identifying information. At this point, Mr. King had been ar-
raigned, bail set and discovery started. On August 4th, the DNA sample, without the identifying details,
was sent to CODIS where it was matched to the 2003 crime evidence. Id.
22
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In addition to the time lag, Justice Scalia chastened the majority's over-
eager acceptance of identification DNA testing by pointing out its practical
flaws. CODIS was comprised of two principal databases one devoted to
known individuals, "Convict and Arrestee Collection," and the other to evi-
dence from crime scenes, "Unsolved Crimes Collection.'14 3 In practice, on-
ly the submitting state laboratory knew the identification of the entries in
the "Convict and Arrestee Collection," the FBI's database did not contain
names or personal identifiers. 1" In an effort to solve cold cases, each week
the genetic samples stored in the crime scene collection were matched up
against the offender records.145 In order for this to work, a database of
knowns, the convicted/arrestee collection, had to be matched with a data-
base of unknowns, unsolved crime scene evidence. 146 Justice Scalia realized
that identification should be limited to the search of the known offender da-
tabase, and not focused on the unknown unmatched evidence collection. 14
The majority's promise that the state procedure would exonerate the inno-
cent was also less than hoped for. 148
In essence, Justice Scalia's argument against the majority's theory was
that CODIS identified evidence, not people. 149 Thus, there were definitional
and linkage problems with the majority's reasoning. Since the Maryland au-
thorities needed to have identifying information about the defendant before
submitting the sample, CODIS was asked to somehow provide what the
state already possessed. Thus, arrestee genetic testing appeared to have been
intended to identify evidence from other cases, not the person in custody,
unless an expanded definition of identification as crime solving was accept-
ed. The Collection Act's enabling section listed five reasons for gathering
DNA evidence at the booking stage, none of which addressed identification
of arrestees. 50 Rather its chief purpose for gathering data was "as part of an
143 Id.
144Id.
'45 Id.; see FBI LAB., NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL 41
(2013), available at http://static.fbi.gov/docs/NDIS-Procedures-Manual-Final-1-31-2013-1.pdf ("On a
weekly basis, a search is run at NDIS to search new and modified DNA records against all records in
accordance with the authorized searches described in the Table of NDIS Searchable Indexes in Section
5.1.").
146 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 1984-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Liptak, supra note 106, at A15. "The FBI CODIS database
includes DNA from unsolved crimes. I [Scalia, J.] know of no indication (and the Court cites none) that
it also includes DNA from all-or even any-crimes whose perpetrators have already been convicted."
King, 133 S.Ct. at 1984 n. 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149 King, 133 S.Ct. at 1985 ("King was not identified by his association with the sample; rather, the sam-
ple was identified by its association with King.").
151 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505 (LexisNexis 2014); id.
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official investigation into a crime.' 151 Citing the statements of public offi-
cials on this litigation, the dissenters concluded that the goals were to re-
duce crime rates and solve open cases. 152
Another practical hole in the identification argument was redundancy. If
a DNA sample for King had already existed in the state database, there
would have been no reason to obtain another sample. 153 In fact, the state's
regulations required significant identification details about the person from
whom a sample was taken, begging the question of the value of using DNA
to identify someone who must already be known by other identifiers. 154 The
dissent concluded that "if the Court's identification theory is not wrong,
there is no such thing as error.' 155
After deconstructing the majority's major premises, Justice Scalia at-
tacked their analogies to 19 th Century criminalistics that were not Fourth
Amendment events, e.g., photographing arrestees (mug shots), Bertillon
measurements, and fingerprints. 156 Fingerprints especially evolved to serve
ends distinct from DNA profiling and in different ways: (1) fingerprints
could be processed expeditiously, while the time lag for DNA was ineffi-
cient for identification; (2) the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identifica-
tion System (IAFIS) contained descriptive information, such as mugshots,
physical characteristics and criminal histories, but CODIS did not include
names or identifiers; and (3) latent prints from crime scenes were not regu-
larly compared with known fingerprints, CODIS was designed to match up
... § 2-505(a)(2); King, 133 S. Ct. at 1985.
152 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1984. The statute did allude to identifying "human remains" and "missing individ-
uals. § 2-505(a)(3)-(4). And the law interdicted using DNA data for unauthorized reasons. § 2-
505(b)(2).
'53 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1986 ("[I1f someone is arrested and law enforcement determines that 'a convicted
offender Statewide DNA Data Base sample already exists' for that arrestee, 'the agency is not required
to obtain a new sample.' But how could the State know if an arrestee has already had his DNA sample
collected, if the point of the sample is to identify who he is?" (citation omitted)); accord People v. Hus-
band, 954 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) ("But once a person's unique genetic profile has
been uploaded to the databank, that person's DNA becomes available for potential matching or exonera-
tion, and, with respect to such person, the purposes of the Executive Law have been wholly fulfilled. No
rational purpose is served by the addition of a second (or third or more) copy of the identical profile,
already tested and analyzed, to the index.").
'54 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1986 ("Maryland's regulations further require that the 'individual collecting a
sample ... verify the identity of the individual from whom a sample is taken by name and, if applicable,
State identification (SID) number.' (But how?) And after the sample is taken, it continues to be identi-
fied by the individual's name, fingerprints, etc.,-rather than (as the Court believes) being used to identi-
fy individuals." (citations omitted)).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1986-87 ("The Court does not actually say whether it believes that taking a person's finger-
prints is a Fourth Amendment search, and our cases provide no ready answer to that question." Id. at
1987.).
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individual profiles with crimes scene evidence. 151 More significantly, fin-
gerprints came in under Fourth Amendment radar, annealed to the justice
system without constitutional or scientific scrutiny.158
The majority predicted that rapid DNA testing was around the corner,
taking the unusual step of relying on hindsight to constitutionalize the use
of technology. 159 At the same time, the influx of arrestee samples would in-
crease the burden and effectively slow down data processing and suspect
profiling. 16 Despite the advances waiting in the wings, Justice Scalia made
this sobering assessment:
And that is the main point, which the Court's discussion of the brave new world
of instant DNA analysis should not obscure. The issue before us is not whether
DNA can some day be used for identification; nor even whether it can today be
used for identification; but whether it was used for identification here. 161
Fingerprints are the de facto national standard of identification, unless
and until DNA identification is fully developed to fill that role. 162 Thus, the
Fourth Amendment was not concerned with bootstrapping future innova-
tions to justify yesterday's searches.
Finally, the dissent thundered against the conflation of identification and
investigation: "Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it occupies
a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protec-
tion of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The Fourth
151 Id. Another important distinction is that fingerprinting was born in the stationhouse, DNA in the la-
boratory. So it is that fingerprinting became a custom, and DNA a science.
158 Id. at 1988.
15' King, 133 S. Ct. at 1988 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
.60 Id. (citing statistics about the uptick in arrests from Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of
Arrest From Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRIC 21 (2011)).
161 Id. at 1988-89.
162 Id. at 1989. Meanwhile, local jails and detention facilities have turned to retina and iris scans as the
highest quality identification metric. See Jails Hope Eye Scanners Can Provide Foolproof Identification
System for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, at A25 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/2
8/us/28eyes.html? r=0 ("The F.B.I. has the fingerprints and criminal history of about 65 million people
in its database. Sheriffs complain that fingerprint search results can take hours or even days, but results
with an iris scan are nearly instant .... Scanning inmates is quick, too. A person simply looks into a
camera, which uses infrared light to illuminate and map the iris. Each iris is unique and contains about
six times more features than a fingerprint."). Eye scanners are an efficient tool for identifying arrestees,
tracking escapees and monitoring releases, but not useful in crime scene investigation at least until
matching procedures and databases are fully developed. See Aliya Sternstein, Eye on Crime: The FBI is
Building a Database of Iris Scans, NEXTGOV (June 27, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-
tech/2012/06/eye-crime-fbi-building-database-iris-scans/56481/("[I]ncreasingly, law enforcement agen-
cies are spending state and federal funds on iris recognition technology at jails to monitor inmates. Some
Missouri prisons are buying the same system the FBI acquired, partly so that they can eventually ex-
change iris images with federal law enforcement officials.").
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Amendment must prevail. '163 Indeed, carrying King's logic to its conclu-
sion, genetic identification would not be constitutionally barred from any
kind of arrest.1 64 Upon conviction for the 2009 assault Maryland had the
right to King's DNA, so it was only the innocent who would be burdened by
the majority's holding. "In other words, this Act manages to burden unique-
ly the sole group for whom the Fourth Amendment's protections ought to be
most jealously guarded: people who are innocent of the State's accusa-
tions.'1 65 So the dissenters closed by intoning the hope that this decision
will "some day be repudiated.' 1 66 Before that day comes, it will depend on
state courts applying their constitutions to be the guardians of genetic priva-
cy. 16
7
C. The State
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision, the Maryland appeals
court confronted for the first time the legitimacy of arrestee sampling under
their constitution. In the first state appeal, King I, the defendant relied solely
on the Fourth Amendment. 16 After the Supreme Court moved the line on
privacy, he resorted to Maryland's constitution for relief. 169 In King II, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland again considered the constitutionality of the
Maryland DNA Collection Act but this time under Article 26 of their state
163 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989.
'6 Id. at 1989 ("Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today's decision,
your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or
wrongly, and for whatever reason.").
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1989-90 (contrasting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332 (2009) as an example of the Court's reversal on suspicionless automobile searches). Justice Scalia
might also have pointed to changes that occur when science revisits forensics. See generally Caitlin M.
Plummer and hnran J. Syed, "Shifted Science" and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L 259
(2012); Marc Price Wolf, Habeas Relief From Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus Provide Re-
lief for Prisoners Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 MINN. J.L. Sc. & TECH. 213
(2008).
167 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Federal interests are
not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the Federal
Constitution requires."). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); NAT'L INST. FOR JUST., supra note 6, at 72-75.
168 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 554 (Md. 2012) (King I) ("The thrust of King's argument was that the
DNA Act could not survive scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and therefore King's arrest was inva-
lid.").
169 King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1040 (Md. 2013) (King II).
26
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constitution.1 7' However, the second trip up the appellate ladder did not turn
out as hoped.
Judged by history and language, Maryland's Article 26 was in lockstep
with the Fourth Amendment. 17 1 And even if grounds existed for a distinct
interpretation, it would not have supported an unprecedented exclusionary
rule. 172 Thus, King faced the double barrier of forging a state constitutional
right and remedy. 1 3 The Court of Appeals deferred to the Supreme Court's
decision interpreting a search and seizure law so similar to their own. 174
Predictably, they adhered to the high court's judgment and reasoning, skirt-
ing the issue of whether an exclusionary remedy existed under state law. 171
The next phase of King's arguments concerned the second DNA sample,
which was obtained by warrant and court order based on the stationhouse
sampling. 176 All claims of procedural error under the Maryland Act ulti-
mately failed. The appeals court found that King had not satisfied the bur-
den of going forward;1 77 even if a statutory violation had been found, his
remedies were confined to the statute, not an unacknowledged exclusionary
rule.1 7S Thus, the only argument based on a statutory prohibition would be
against using DNA sampling for "information unrelated to identifica-
... Id. at 1039-40 (finding that Mr. King defaulted on the state constitutional issue by failing to raise it
in the trial court). Nonetheless, the court exercised its discretionary powers to hear the challenge. Id. The
outcome of this decision did raise concerns over preservation and the risks attendant to coupling federal
and state constitutional claims together.
'.' Id. at 1041 (quoting Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights: "That all warrants, without
oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and op-
pressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without
naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.").
172 Id. at 1041-42.
"I Id. at 1042.
114 King, 76 A.3d at 1042. Chief Justice Bell authored the dissent, pointing out the inconsistency of the
Maryland appeals court finding a Fourth Amendment violation in the first round, but discarding that
reasoning under their comparable state constitutional provision, specifically stating that "[i]t is my belief
that the conclusion this Court reached applying the Fourth Amendment is equally supported by applica-
tion of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which we determined, at that time, to be a
moot argument. Accordingly, I would re-affirm our judgment on that State Law ground." Id. at 1048-
1049 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
'I Id. at 1042.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1043.
171 Id. at 1045-46 ("Although some other circumstances may present an opportunity to find that a viola-
tion of the Act amounted to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, this case is
certainly not that one. The question is not whether the Act was violated, but whether the alleged statuto-
ry violation could amount to a Fourth Amendment violation in its own right. Were the Act's technical
protocols for DNA collection violated, the collection would remain a reasonable search nonetheless.
Therefore, the statutory violations alleged by King, assuming arguendo they occurred, do not alter the
Supreme Court's holding in King. The initial collection of King's DNA-whether pursuant to the Act's
technical requirements or not-was constitutional." Id. at 1047).
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tion".) 9 This would hinge on a definition of "identification" distinct from
the Supreme Court's and ideally founded on state constitutional law. 80
For the time being, the Supreme Court has taken away the ability of
states with Fourth Amendment mirroring provisions, like Maryland, to
evolve their own state privacy interests. Thus, the future of genetic privacy
before conviction will depend on the Supreme Court's willingness to revisit
Maryland v. King in the light of sea changes in state laws and court deci-
sions as well as revised understandings of DNA profiling.181
More than half the states have laws authorizing some form of DNA test-
on-arrest with varying standards and procedures in terms of qualifying of-
fenses, timing for taking a sample, conditions for destroying samples, and
their use in court proceedings.182 In light of the Maryland's court's decision
in King II, it is the state collection statute that will draw the line on infor-
mation capture and establish the remedy for its abuse, unless the state's
constitution is found to exceed the limits of Fourth Amendment interpreta-
tion.
The distinction between sampling (cheek swab) and profiling (database
matching) should be the trip wire for investigative search warrants.183 Gath-
'79 King, 76 A.3d at 1048.
"'0 See Stuart, supra note 54, at 1139.
181 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1990 n.6 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia pointed
to a recent reversal in the Fourth Amendment context: "Compare, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981) (suspicionless search of a car permitted upon arrest of the driver), with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332 (2009) (on second thought, no).") Moreover, reversals in juvenile death penalty and life without
parole sentencing based in part on scientific grounds offer additional sanguine examples of precedent
reversals. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012) ("The evidence presented to us
in these cases indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper's and Graham's conclusions
have become even stronger."); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) ("No recent data pro-
vide reason to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner's
amici point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differ-
ences between juvenile and adult minds."); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005) ("[A]s any
parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm,
'[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than
in adults and are more understandable among the young.'"); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958,
1989 (2013) (discussing Justice Scalia's suggestion for revising the Court's decision and references to
other sources).
182 Stuart, supra note 54, at 1116. "The Appendix contains a brief survey of the arrestee DNA testing
statutes of all fifty states, including whether a state has a statute, what crimes trigger the statute, whether
juveniles are subjected to testing, and the expungement procedures." Id. at 1116 n.38.
183 Id. at 1120-21; see King, 133 S.Ct. at 1966 (explaining that the detectives in the King case obtained a
search warrant before a second extraction and profiling for the new case.). Information rich DNA sam-
pling, like blood draws and computer searches, ought to necessitate a warrant to assure that they are
used for their intended purposes. Indeed, the best bulwark against fishing expeditions in human biolog-
ics is constitutional particularity; see, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2014)
("[T]he Government violated Ganias's Fourth Amendment rights by seizing and indefinitely retaining
non-responsive computer records, and then searching them when it later developed probable cause. Ac-
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ering a clump of cells might seem mildly intrusive and scarcely enough to
dust up a constitutional storm; but it is their linkage through database analy-
sis that peels away layers of privacy, the presumption of innocence, and
probable cause. This is especially distressing in cases where the DNA
match is the principal or sole evidence against the accused; when a DNA
swab might very well be tantamount to conviction.184 This de facto DNA
rap sheet might inevitably lead to data abuse as with other forms of super-
surveillance.185 It will likely double the burden of defendants who must
contest their new arrest charges at the same time as unrelated charges
stemming from the DNA match.
II. To ERR IS HUMAN
DNA's scientific reputation is almost akin to magic, but its forensic ap-
plications are subject to the faults and limitations of other proof. Every
stage in the collection, profiling, databanking and analysis of DNA evi-
dence can be subject to human error, mechanical error, computer error, sta-
tistical error, false positives and cognitive biases. 8 6 Thus, whether used for
identification or investigation, its vaunted reputation should not blind judg-
es to the realities and limitations of DNA proof.
cordingly, Ganias's personal records, seized in the execution of the November 2003 warrant and retained
for two-and-a-half years, should have been suppressed."); State v. Martines, 331 P.3d 105, 111 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2014), pet. rev. granted, State v. Martines, 339 P.3d 634 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 2014) ("Where the
State has probable cause to suspect driving under the influence, the requirement to obtain a particular-
ized warrant for blood testing will prevent the State from rummaging among the various items of infor-
mation contained in a blood sample for evidence unrelated to drunk driving. For example, when a blood
sample is obtained in the course of investigating driving under the influence, the State may not-without
further warrant-use the sample to produce a DNA profile that can be added to government data
banks."). See generally Kimel, supra note 136, at 970 ("Then, as with post-seizure computer searches,
courts should require the government to obtain a search warrant - based on probable cause to believe
that the DNA profile to be searched will produce evidence of the crime under investigation -before the
government is allowed to search a DNA profile that it created.").
184 See King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 554 (Md. 2012) (referring to the 2003 rape case, the court in King I
pointed out: "The DNA database 'hit' was the only evidence of probable cause supporting the indict-
ment."). See generally Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers--Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Con-
vict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130 (2010); Strutin, Limitations of Forensics as Standalone Evidence of Guilt,
supra note 18, at 5.
185 See Stuart, supra note 54, at 1152. ("The officer may have arrested the wrong person. The officer
may have made an invalid arrest. The majority's holding [in Maryland v. King] will expand DNA testing
with officers more apt to arrest in those states that test all arrestees and prosecutors charging for more
serious crimes in jurisdictions that test for only certain crimes. Even if the arrest is completely legiti-
mate, the arrestee deserves the constitutional protection against search and seizure. Because the arrestee
has not yet been proven guilty, there is no diminished privacy interest.").
186 See generally Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous Prec-
edent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 286-87 (2005).
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In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, the Court
held that the discovery of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes locations was not
patent eligible while creation of a sequence of complementary DNA or
cDNA was. 8 Concerning their understanding of genetics, Justice Scalia
observed:
I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I-A and
some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular bi-
ology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my
own belief. It suffices for me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and
the expert briefs presented here .... 188
Indeed, commentators have taken the Court to task for its misconstruc-
tion of genetic science independent of their legal reasoning."' And in
Maryland v. King, the majority's rationalization that DNA was infallible
and limited to confirmatory identification has also been the subject of criti-
cism.190 On too many occasions, courts and lawyers have pronounced DNA
infallible ex cathedra.191 It seems to be human nature to embrace forensic
tools before they have been properly vetted. 192
Professor Thompson has cataloged the most common reasons for dis-
trusting DNA sampling, testing and matching: (1) cross-contamination; (2)
mislabeled samples; and (3) misinterpretation of results; in addition to re-
cording errors, problems with mixtures, and partially degraded, or contami-
nated samples.193 Any one or a combination of these circumstances can re-
I"' Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013).
188 Id. at 2120 (Scalia, J., concurring).
189 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Supreme Court's Bad Science on Gene Patents, BLOOMBERG (June 13,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013 -06-13/the-supreme-court-s-bad-science-on-gene-
patents; Noam Prywes, The Supreme Court's Sketchy Science: Their BRCA Patent Ruling Reads Like an
Earnest Seventh Grader's Book Report, SLATE (June 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/health an
d science/science/2013/06/supreme court patent case science the-justices misunderstand molecular
biology.html; Steven Salzberg, Supreme Court Gets Decision Right, Science Wrong, on Gene Patents,
FORBES (June 13, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/health and science/science/2013/06/supreme co
urt patent case science the-justices misunderstand molecular biology.html.
190 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 106, at A15; Strutin, DNA, Privacy and Personhood: The Crime of Being
Alive, supra note 10.
'.' William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still Controversial in Some Cases, CHAMPION,
Dec. 2012, at 12, 22.
192 See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) (discussing the need to improve forensic
science practices); Ken Strutin, Strengthening Forensic Science: The Next Wave of Scholarship, LLRX
(Nov. 23, 2009) http://www.llrx.com/features/forensicscience.htm (discussing improving the forensic
science disciplines).
"' William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence: The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC
EXPLANATIONS: SENSE AND NONSENSE 229-33, 241-42 (Sheldon Krimsky et al. eds., 2013). See gen-
erally Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudu-
lent Results, 99 A.B.A. J. 44 (2013).
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sult in false reports of DNA matches (laboratory analysis), false cold hit
(database search), consumption of small samples prohibiting retesting or
confirmatory testing, problems related to low copy number or low template
or touch DNA, investigator bias and observer expectancy.194 Even retesting
cannot purge a conclusion of all errors, 95 any more than cross-examination
can expose all falsehoods and mistakes. 19 6 No human endeavor is free of
human error or human bias.19 Indeed, biases generally can spillover into
the aims of prosecution and law enforcement and the judgments of ex-
perts. 198
For years Germany, France and Austria were inundated by a bizarre
chain of dozens of crimes including six homicides all threaded with a single
DNA link pointing to a female suspect.199 The Phantom of Heilbronn, as
she became known, had confounded investigators and profilers as her DNA
kept popping up in new and cold cases.200 In 2009, the German authorities
realized that a fundamental error had been misleading them and retraced
their forensic steps back to the cotton swabs used for collecting genetic
samples from the crime scenes.20 1 While the swabs were sterilized at the
'" William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence: The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC
EXPLANATIONS: SENSE AND NONSENSE, supra note 193, at 232-33.
' Thompson et al., supra note 191, at 12.
196 See Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and at Risk,
14 WIDENER L. REv. 427, 427-28 (2009); Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mis-
taken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross -Examination, 36 STETSON L. REv. 727, 729 (2007).
'" See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpreta-
tion, 51 SCI. & JUST. 204, 204 (Dec. 2011).
198 See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the validity of expert testimony); Saul M.
Kassin et al., Confessions That Corrupt: Evidence From the DNA Exoneration Case Files, 23 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 41 (2012) (discussing the corruptive potential of confessions); Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks,
Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126 (2013)
(discussing incentives for police, prosecutors, and forensic scientists to convict someone); Erin Morris,
Cognitive Bias and the Evaluation of Forensic Evidence, CHAMPION, May 2012, at 12 (discussing cog-
nitive bias in the chain of forensic analysis); Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased by the
Side That Retained Them?, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1889 (2013) (discussing bias in forensic science proce-
dures); William C. Thompson, Beyond Bad Apples: Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in Wrongful
Convictions, 37 Sw. L. REv. 971 (2008) (discussing how misuse of forensic science can lead to wrong-
ful convictions).
'.. See Claudia Himmelreich, Germany's Phantom Serial Killer: A DNA Blunder, TIME, Mar. 27, 2009,
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1888126,00.html.
200 Id.
201 Id. ("Trying to establish the identity of a burned corpse found in 2002, they were re-examining the
fingerprints of a male asylum seeker taken from his asylum application made many years earlier. The
fingerprints contained the Phantom's female DNA. Impossible, they thought, so they repeated the test
with a different cotton swab - and this time found no trace of the Phantom's DNA.").
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factory to eliminate "bacteria, viruses and fungi," they left undisturbed the
DNA of anyone who might have handled them.22
The lessons from the Phantom case were not lost on the police.2 3 It was
a new type of contamination that would chasten law enforcement forensics.
And for the defense bar it affirmed the dangers of tunnel vision created by
DNA's reputation:
What we need to avoid is the assumption that the producer of the traces is au-
tomatically the culprit. Judges tend to be so blinded by the shiny, seemingly
perfect evidence of DNA traces that they sometimes ignore the whole picture.
DNA evidence on a crime scene says nothing about how it got there. There is
good reason for not permitting convictions on the basis of DNA circumstantial
evidence alone. 204
Generally, a newly unearthed genetically linked crime will impact the
bail, guilt and sentencing in the new arrest where the DNA has been sam-
pled. Hence, DNA linkages can change the dynamic of a case not involving
DNA evidence by introducing a connection to another felony before any
challenges to the reliability and accuracy of that match can be raised.
In Maryland v. King, Justice Kennedy described DNA testing as "unpar-
alleled" and "irrefutable. '205 Such absolute faith tends to skew critical think-
ing about other evidence. The reflected glory and subtle biases behind the
process of DNA matching are doubly dangerous in the rush to judgment
and can inflate otherwise dubious evidence. Unvetted and uncorroborated
DNA matches create a presumption of guilt and shift the burden of proof.
Prejudgment, even when based on science, is not evidence of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In every DNA prosecution the defendant is forced to re-
spond to evidence presumed infallible, thus diverting resources from other
viable evidentiary challenges and warping the theory of the case as well as
its presentation. The genetic match imposes on a defendant an obligation to
offer proof to negate it. Thus, DNA evidence can impose burdens on the ac-
202 Id. ("Cotton swabs are sterilized before being used to collect DNA samples, but while sterilizing re-
moves bacteria, viruses and fungi, it does not destroy DNA. " "Germany's Federal Criminal Police Of-
fice is investigating the theory that certain batches of cotton swabs could have been contaminated at
some point in their production, from when the raw cotton was picked to when the swabs were packed.
Forensic analysts in Stuttgart have been testing unused cotton swabs for the Phantom's DNA but say that
so far they have found no evidence of contamination.").
203 Id. ("Berlin police spokesman Michael Merkle tells TIME that the city's investigators are now check-
ing whether they also use cotton swabs from Greiner Bio-One. "A consequence of the present case may
be to start randomly checking the cotton swabs we are supplied with for traces of DNA - which, in
turn, harbors the risk of contaminating them," he says.").
204 Himmelreich, supra note 199 (quoting Stefan Knig of the Berlin Association of Lawyers).
205 See Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1972 ("[T]he only difference between DNA analysis and the
accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.... The DNA collect-
ed from arrestees is an irrefutable identification of the person from whom it was taken.").
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cused's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; 2 6 the decision
whether to testify or present evidence; and defense counsel's ability to ef-
fectively challenge it.
The latest fly in the ointment is the risk created by fabrication and plant-
ing of evidence stemming from police, analyst or third-party misconduct.20
For instance, false positive matches might be attributable to planting evi-
dence at the crime scene that has been copied from CODIS. 2 8 Then there is
the scenario where the defendant reveals to her attorney that she planted
such evidence to implicate someone else. 209 The discovery that genetic pro-
files can be duplicated (impersonated) or totally artificial (fabricated) de-
tracts from the uniqueness of DNA and its verity. 210 It compels reopening
assumptions about DNA matches that have not been authenticated against
fakery. Artificial DNA is a genetic mask that can mislead investigators, dis-
tract analysts and inculpate the wrong people. Indeed, laboratories are
206 See, e.g., State v. Gauthier, 298 P.3d 126, 132 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (finding introduction of de-
fendant's refusal to consent to DNA sampling was reversible error). See generally Jeremy Gans, Some-
thing to Hide: DNA, Surveillance and Self-Incrimination, 13 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 168 (2001-
2002); Strutin, DNA and the Double Helix of Constitutional Rights, supra note 4.
207 See William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence: The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC
EXPLANATIONS: SENSE AND NONSENSE, supra note 193, at 250-53.
208 The experience with fingerprint falsification and forgery is also informative. See, e.g., Boris Geller et
al., Fingerprint Forgery A Survey, 46 J. FORENSIC ScI. 731, 732 (2001) ("One of the worst possible
mistakes that can be made in the field of fingerprint examination is to overlook a forgery. Professionally
produced forgeries are not easy to detect, especially when most technicians have never seen, nor claim
that they ever have seen a forged fingerprint." ; Boris Geller et al., A Chronological Review of Finger-
print Forgery, 44 J. FORENSIC ScI. 963, 963 (1999); see generally NELSON E. ROTH, THE NEW YORK
STATE POLICE EVIDENCE TAMPERING INVESTIGATION, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE PATAKI,
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1997); Richard Perez-Pena, Supervision of Troopers Faulted
in Evidence-Tampering Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at Bi, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/04/
nyregion/supervision-of-troopers-faulted-in-evidence-tampering-scandal.html ("Concluding a four-year
investigation into the worst scandal in state police history, a special prosecutor said today that troopers
were able to plant evidence routinely in criminal cases across a broad swath of rural New York because
they had no fear of detection by supervisors, who maintained a willful ignorance.").
209 See generally Ken Strutin, Preserving Attorney-Client Privilege at the Cost of Another's Innocence,
17 TUX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 499 (2011).
210 See Frunlkin et al., supra note 108, at 95.
211 Moreover, law enforcement investigation might need to someday employ repurposed, fabricated or
planted DNA. In a similar vein, federal authorities have already used actual social media profiles to con-
duct in-depth undercover operations, much to the consternation of those impersonated and their social
media hosts. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Once You've Dehumanized Drug Offenders, It's Easy to Steal
Their Identities, WASH. POST., Oct. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/
10/07/once-youve-dehumanized-drug-offenders-its-easy-to-steal-their-identities/; Terrence McCoy,
DEA Created a Fake Facebook Profile in This Woman's Name Using Seized Pics Then Impersonated
Her, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/07/de
a-created-a-fake-facebook-profile-in-this-womans-name-using-seized-pics-then-impersonated-her/;
Assoc. Press, Facebook Unfriends Federal Drug Agency, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2014), http://politi.co/lw
by63q; Chris Hamby, Government Set Up a Fake Facebook Page in This Woman's Name, BUzZFEED
NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/government-says-federal-agents-can-impe
rsonate-woman-online#.uxLrQEGz8 ("The Justice Department is claiming, in a little-noticed court fil-
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unable to differentiate between fake DNA and the real thing without au-
thentication, i.e., a test for methylation. 2 In effect, fabricated DNA can
cause the same damage to the accuracy and reliability of legal judgments as
cross-contamination.
The result is the real possibility of DNA identity theft and evidence
planting. The availability of DNA samples and profiles from multiple
sources only increases the risks.213 Documented cases of forensic fraud by
analysts, laboratories, and private parties suggest the possibilities.2 4 "The
incidents of falsification of forensic evidence, the availability of DNA sam-
ples and profiles and the ease of DNA fabrication underscore the need to
reevaluate the way we look at DNA admissibility and reliability.' 2 5 DNA
fabrication, i.e., copying, manufacturing and planting, is the latest link in a
catalog of errors, misconduct and fallacies that can cast doubt on DNA
sampling, testing, profiling, reporting and expert testimony. The manufac-
ture of DNA is new science and it warrants a second look at admissibility
issues.216 The CSI effect will further exacerbate the problem because lay
people will not be making the fine distinctions between genuine and fake
DNA and the myriad concerns over DNA reliability and accuracy.21 Unfor-
tunately, like fingerprints, DNA has received a pass in the public mind as
well as in judicial decisions.
The potential collective problems with every DNA sampling and analysis
demand a preliminary hearing of some kind to review the science and its
administration in each case. "[T]he discovery of the ability to easily fabri-
cate DNA evidence as well as a long history of DNA falsification and gross
ineptness by crime laboratories demonstrate that DNA-based evidence's
sterling reputation is undeserved.' '218 Thus, this tell all biologic is suscepti-
ble to being fabricated, copied, stolen, swapped and planted to avoid appre-
hension or implicate someone falsely.
ing, that a federal agent had the right to impersonate a young woman online by creating a Facebook page
in her name without her knowledge. Government lawyers also are defending the agent's right to scour
the woman's seized cell phone and to post photographs - including racy pictures of her and even one of
her young son and niece - to the phony social media account, which the agent was using to communi-
cate with suspected criminals."). See generally Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical
and Constitutional Boundaries, supra note 93.
212 Kristen Bolden, DNA Fabrication, A Wake Up Call: The Need to Reevaluate the Admissibility and
Reliability of DNA Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 409,414 (2011).
2 13 Id. at 416.
214 Id. at 417-19.
215 Id. at 424-25.
216 Id. at 409.
217 Bolden, supra note 212, at 431-32, 436.
2 "Bolden, supra note 212, at 440 (suggesting the application of the Frye-Kelly test to combat authenti-
cation issues).
34
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 18 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol18/iss3/5
DNA WITHOUT WARRANT
Human error and human bias increase the risk of false accusation and
wrongful conviction. Subjectivity is the enemy of accuracy in investigation,
interrogation, forensic analysis and prosecution. And then there is the infla-
tionary impressiveness of forensic-scientific evidence.219 The results can be
false database matches,220 mislabeled samples, intentional falsification or
fabrication, cross -contamination and secondary transfer.22 1 Practically
speaking, duplicate and mislabeled entries are plagued with potential errors
unrelated to science, i.e., spelling errors; false names or aliases; and tran-
scription errors. The same types of human errors found in rap sheets and
other criminal justice documents can plague all forensic recordkeeping.222
Convictions based on outmoded analytical protocols, in addition to those
cases where no DNA testing had been performed, should also be re-
viewed.223 Many wrongfully convicted persons in prison would benefit
from the historical revisionism of new science and new standards. Indeed,
new evidence theory should acknowledge these developments and review
cases where DNA matches were admitted based on lower thresholds than
today. Indeed, convictions based on science or technology should have ex-
219 See Saul Kassin et al., Confessions That Corrupt: Evidence From the DNA Exoneration Case Files,
23 PSYCHOL. ScI. 41, 42-43 (2012). Based on a study of wrongful convictions collected by the Inno-
cence project, researchers discovered a spillover or CSI effect tied to the presence of confessions. "Mul-
tiple evidence errors were significantly more likely to exist in false-confession cases than in eyewitness
cases; in order of frequency, false confessions were accompanied by invalid or improper forensic sci-
ence, eyewitness identifications, and snitches and informants; and in cases containing multiple errors,
confessions were most likely to have been obtained first." Id. See generally Ken Strutin, Forensic Evi-
dence and the CSI Effect, LLRX (May 9, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/forensicevidencecsieffect.
htm.
220 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF
THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 269 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0601/fin
al.pdf (" [Tihe examiners committed errors in the examination procedure, and ... the misidentification
could have been prevented through a more rigorous application of several principles of latent fingerprint
identification.").
221 See generally William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence: The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC
EXPLANATIONS: SENSE AND NONSENSE, supra note 193.
222 See William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence: The Myth of Infallibility, in GENETIC
EXPLANATIONS: SENSE AND NONSENSE, supra note 193 at 227-33.
223 See John Roman et al., Post-Conviction DNA Testing and Wrongful Conviction, URBAN INST. 11
(2012), available at http://www.urban.org[UploadedPDF/412589-Post-Conviction-DNA-Testing-and-W
rongful-Conviction.pdf?RSSFeed=Urban.xml ("The Virginia (VA) model of post-conviction DNA test-
ing... is unique. Rather than start with claims of actual innocence from living convicted offenders, the
state received funding to test all existing physical evidence that might contain DNA for serious person
crimes that resulted in conviction. The claims of actual innocence (or admittance of actual guilt) there-
fore did not influence the decision to conduct DNA testing. This 'test-them-all' approach to postconvic-
tion DNA testing has never been replicated by any other state.").
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piration dates compelling courts to reexamine judgments rendered before
the rules changed.2 24
Another response might be a categorical exclusionary rule for "unvali-
dated" genetic evidence. 2 5 This "common sense'2 26 remedy might be based
on state constitutional rights and legislative enactments that protect genetic
privacy as a civil right and public policy, supplementing the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA)22 and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA). 228 A Genetic Bill of
Rights would also provide pre-emptive protection against prying infor-
mation from DNA with new technologies, which can only now be obtained
with a warrant or probable cause upon an arrest for a qualifying offense.229
Overall, DNA as identification is complicated and fallible in ways that oth-
er metrics are not. Every step from extraction, evidence collection, storage,
databanking, profiling, and matching to expert analyses is subject to error.
Thus, DNA evidence is not the perfection that the King majority imagined.
III. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
In United States v. Jones and Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court
ruled that global positioning system (GPS) and thermal imaging tools, re-
spectively, were invasive because they captured the secret dimensions of
224 See, e.g., ENFSI DNA WORKING GRP., DNA-DATABASE MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 33 (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.enfsi.eu/sites/default/files/documents/enfs
i 2014 document on dna-database management O.pdf (addressing the concerns over errors due to
false or partial matches based on coincidence rather than causal link: "ENFSI-recommendation 24:
DNA-database managers should be aware of the possibility of adventitious matches and be able to cal-
culate their expected numbers for the matches they report. When reporting a DNA-database match, a
warning should be included indicating the factors that increase the possibility of finding an adventitious
match (size of the database, number of searches, mixed and partial profiles/random match probability,
presence of family members.")).
225 See, e.g., Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical
Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 Sw. L. REv. 965, 985 (2008) (putting forward a model
statute that would enlarge the court's gatekeeper role in summarily vetting unreliable evidence as re-
vealed by exoneration litigation and forestall capital prosecutions based principally on certain types of
proof: "(a) eyewitness [stranger] identification testimony; (b) a confession; (c) a criminal informant; or
(d) unvalidated forensic evidence.").
226 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) ("[O]ur holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential
part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it
also makes very good sense. There is no war between the Constitution and common sense.") (emphasis
added).
2' Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub, L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
228 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881.
229 See generally Jaclyn G. Ambriscoe, Massachusetts Genetic Bill of Rights: Chipping Away at Genetic
Privacy, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1177 (2012); Elizabeth Collins, Do You Know Where Your DNA Is?
The Need for DNA Legislation in Ohio, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 349 (2013).
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private life.23 0 However, in King, the Court did not ask whether taking a
piece of someone and putting it under a microscope was less intrusive than
through-the-wall technologies. Sanctioning warrantless genetic sampling
upon arrest, the King decision demonstrated that forensics was not aligned
with science but rather with criminalistics or the legal impression of sci-
ence. Genetic testing has become the metadata of identification forensics.
According to the King majority's reasoning, one cheek swab could identify
the arrestee, reveal his disposition for violence and measure his risk for
flight as well as free the innocent. It was the miracle booking procedure.
But in reality it surreptitiously created a link to unsolved crimes without
probable cause.
Which poses the greatest threat to privacy, the cell phone searched inci-
dent to an arrest or the DNA sampled from it? Human DNA is hard to con-
tain, it leaves a trail throughout the biosphere, including and especially on
those items that might be seized, used or touched in the course of an ar-
rest.23 1 If an arrestee has an expectation of privacy in an object, like a cell
phone, is there an expectation of privacy in the DNA deposited on it by the
owner? 23 2
In response to revelations about mass digital surveillance by the govern-
ment, the custodians of cell phone information services have responded
with new levels of encryption and privacy protection.2 33 This in turn has a
created a new tension for criminal investigators who cannot access the
technology.234 Some regulatory backdoor access might be the answer for
law enforcement, but they will encounter the same privacy objections to the
retention of archival data.235 A new layer of privacy protection, such as a
230 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
231 See Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 754 (Md. 2014), cert. den. Raynor v. Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1509
(2015). In this post-King decision, the defendant had refused consent to DNA sampling in the course of
a rape investigation. Nonetheless, the police obtained biological residue from the chair he was sitting in
at the precinct. Id.
232 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy,
100 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 866, 869 (2006) (suggesting that shed or abandoned DNA should be treated as
sui generis due to its unique and hybrid nature - a physical body element that is also an information
container.)
233 See David E. Sanger & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.L Director Hints at Action as Google and Apple Lock Up
Cellphone Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2014, at A19.
234 See id. ("Apple and Google have announced new software that would automatically encrypt the con-
tents of cellphones, using codes that even the companies could not crack."); Orin Kerr, Would a New
Crime of "'Willful Refusal to Comply with a Decryption Order" Be the Best Answer to the Device De-
cryption Puzzle?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 17, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/17/would-a-new-crime-of-willful-refusal-to-comply-with-a-
decryption-order-be-the-best-answer-to-the-device-decryption-puzzle/.
235 Cf Theresa Papademetriou, EUROPEAN UNION: ECJ INVALIDATES DATA RETENTION DIRECTIVE 4
(Lib. Cong. 2014).
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DNA biometric password, might become the focal point of privacy expecta-
tions in technology.3 6
Law enforcement can use test-on-arrest, traffic stops, and stop-and-frisk
as physical predicates for collecting quantities of information dispropor-
tionate to the inquiry. 3 DNA extends the limits of human bodily infor-
mation, even beyond the scope of a cavity search; hence it extends the
boundaries of privacy. Moreover, Katz protects medical privacy. 238 Thus, it
might be wise to anticipate the cross-over question of how far can the police
go in searching biotechnology, such as medical implants or commercial
chip devices that can hold reams of private data.239
In essence, King was a search for evidence incident to an arrest made
constitutionally equivalent to a stationhouse booking procedure. Both King
236 See, e.g., Elisabeth Hulette, Police Can Require Cellphone Fingerprint, Not Pass Code, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Oct. 30, 2014, http://hamptonroads.com/2014/10/police-can-require-cellphone-fingerprint-not-
pass-code ("Judge Steven C. Frucci ruled this week that giving police a fingerprint is akin to providing a
DNA or handwriting sample or an actual key, which the law permits. A pass code, though, requires the
defendant to divulge knowledge, which the law protects against, according to Frucci's written opinion.").
See also Commonwealth v. Baust, 2014 Va. Cir. LEXIS 93 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 28, 2014).
237 See generally Sodal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 69 (1992) ("In our view, the reason why an officer
might enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether the
Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental interfer-
ence. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of
the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an
eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occa-
sion, it would be 'anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."' (citations omitted));
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("It matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any
great personal value to respondent - serial numbers rather than (what might conceivably have been
hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A search is a search, even if it happens to
disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.").
211 See, e.g., Malcomson v. Liberty Nw., 376 Mont. 306, 314, 339 P.3d 1235 (2014) (holding that infor-
mational privacy governed by Katz (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),) encompasses medical
records).
239 See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder & Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Chip Planted Under Skin Approved for Use in
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at Al; Jim Finkle, U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices
for Possible Cyber Flaws, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/20
14/10/22/us-cybersecurity-medicaldevices-insight-idUSKCNOIBODQ20141022 ("The senior DHS offi-
cial said the agency is working with manufacturers to identify and repair software coding bugs and other
vulnerabilities that hackers can potentially use to expose confidential data or attack hospital equipment..
• . According to the senior DHS official, the agency started examining healthcare equipment about two
years ago, when cybersecurity researchers were becoming more interested in medical devices that in-
creasingly contained computer chips, software, wireless technology and Internet connectivity, making
them more susceptible to hacking."); Andy Greenberg, Want An RFID Chip Implanted into your Hand?,
FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012). http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/08/13/want-an-rfid-chip-
implanted-into-your-hand-heres-what-the-diy-surgery-looks-like-video/ ("The practical appeal of an
RFID implant, in theory, is quick authentication that's faster, cheaper and more reliable than other bio-
metrics like thumbprints or facial scans. When the chip is hit with a radio frequency signal, it emits a
unique identifier number that functions like a long, unguessable password.").
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and Chimel involved taking custody of a suspect's body and approved a lim-
ited search of person, personal space and their effects.240 But the Supreme
Court in Riley v. California rejected the warrantless search of cell phone
contents seized incident to arrest. 241 And its unanimity contrasted with the
split in King. While both cases involved an arrest and a warrantless search
of an arrestee, they differed in the kind and type of information, digital data
and DNA, and information containers, a cell phone and human cells. Riley
was an incidental custodial search into technology;24 2 while King was a bod-
ily custodial intrusion to gather genetic material for identification and in-
vestigative purposes.243
According to the Court's analysis in Riley, the Fourth Amendment's "rea-
sonableness" standard demanded warrants for investigative searches, absent
specific exceptions.244 Indeed, this standard illuminated the distinctions be-
tween probable cause as understood by law enforcement in the act of crime
detection and probable cause as applied by a "neutral and detached magis-
trate".24 5 Then, Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, acknowledged the
century long history of exceptions created for searches incident to arrest,24 6
which began with Weeks v. United States24 and culminated in Chimel v.
California,248 United States v. Robinson249 and Arizona v. Gant.25 °
The chief foundations for this exception, as declared in Chimel, were of-
ficer safety and evidence preservation. 251 But in Robinson the Court backed
off a strict application of an approach that required a court to second guess
240 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
241 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
242 Id. at 2480.
243 King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013).
244 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2482.
245 Id. ("Such a warrant ensures that the inferences to support a search are 'drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime."' (citation omitted)).
246 Id. at 2482-84.
247 Weeks v. United States., 232 U.S. 383 (1914). "[T]he right on the part of the Government, always
recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Id. at 392.
248 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (defendant arrested in his home for burglary in coin shop
led to an extensive search of entire home and furnishings that revealed fruits of crime).
249 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). (involving pat down search after traffic stop for
driving with revoked license that uncovered "crumpled up cigarette package" holding more than a dozen
heroin capsules).
211 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (defendant arrested during a traffic stop for driving with a sus-
pended license was handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol vehicle; a search of his jacket sitting
on the backseat of his car revealed cocaine).
251 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (finding search incident to arrest encompassed defendant's person and
area "within his immediate control" to discover weapons or potential evidence of criminality).
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the legitimacy of the search based on what was actually found. 52 Thus, the
patina of a valid arrest based on probable cause sanitized the seizure of al-
most anything discovered on the person of the arrestee notwithstanding the
Chimel principles-unless it involved the special circumstances of a vehicle
search as in Gant 5 3
Against this background, Justice Roberts envisioned a new corollary to
the Chimel line: Information Age searches that retreated from a "mechani-
cal application" of Robinson.2 54 The cell phone represented a unique merger
of people and technology.2 55 Thus, the expectation of privacy in computer
technology was different from the privacy of "physical objects" that fell
within Robinson's overarching foundations: (1) safety and evidence preser-
vation interests present in every case; and (2) the "significantly diminished"
256arrestee's privacy expectations. There was no common ground between
the search of a physical object, such as the cigarette package in Robinson,
and the ransacking of a personal computer in the guise of a cellular phone.
Thus, Robinson's holding did not extend into the digital arena of personal
technology.2 Indeed, the Court imagined that there was little risk that ei-
ther of Chimel's foundations, officer safety and evidence preservation,
would be implicated by imposing a warrant requirement for cell phone
252 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014); see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 ("A police officer's
determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily
a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each in-
stance into an analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what
a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search inci-
dent to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes
the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the per-
son is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reason-
able' search under that Amendment.").
253 Gant, 556 U.S. at 335 ("The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's reaching-
distance rule determine Belton's scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle
search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the
interior of the vehicle. Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004),
and following the suggestion in Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id., at
632, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to
arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehi-
cle.").
254 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484-85.
255 Id. at 2484 ("[Miodern cell phones ... are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.").
256 Id. ("[W]hile Robinson's categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical
objects, neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital content on cell phones.").
257 Id. at 2484-85.
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searches. 258 And of course, exigent circumstances would be available to jus-
tify warrantless searches on a case-by-case basis9
Notwithstanding the fact that taking someone into custody might be a
"volatile" scenario, that the arrestee had a diminished expectation of priva-
cy, that the principle reason behind an arrest was to acquire "physical do-
minion" over a suspect, the Fourth Amendment retained some vitality.260
Citing Maryland v. King, Justice Roberts noted that custody did not quash
all privacy interests.26 1 Indeed, the Justices appeared to be taken with the
idea of the portable computerized phone as a "World on a Wire" ;262 its sheer
capacity for holding data and processing power placed it into a new and an
unprecedented category of private personal information.
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other ob-
jects that might be kept on an arrestee's person. The term "cell phone" is itself
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that al-
so happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as
easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, li-
braries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers. 263
The Fourth Amendment was written for a natural world that placed phys-
ical limits on the amount of information that might be carried on someone's
person. But the minicomputer, in whatever manifestation, was a virtual host
to data far beyond the borderlines of "persons, houses, papers, and effects".
And that distance will only become greater. 264 Further, as suggested by the
GPS trackers in United States v. Jones, smartphones opened the door to
mosaics of interconnected and interrelated details that would permit law en-
forcement to compose the timeless lifelogging details of activities, move-
ments, interests, communications and records that no one photograph, video
or writing could possibly convey.265 This mosaic theory that Justice Roberts
258 Riley, 134 S.Ct.,at 2485-88.
2 59 Id. at 2486.
260 Id. at 2488.
261 Id. ("[W]hen 'privacy-related concerns are weighty enough' a 'search may require a warrant, not-
withstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee."' (citing Maryland v. King, 133
S.Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013))).
262 See id. at 2489; Ben Brantley, Worlds Within Worlds Within Worlds. And a Duane Reade., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2012, at 7, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/theater/reviews/world-of-wires-at-the-ki
tchen-review.html? r=0 (making reference to the title of a 1973 German made-for-TV movie, "Welt am
Draht," based on the American novel Simulacron-3 (1964) by Daniel F. Galouye that described the intri-
cate interlacing of "real" and "virtual" worlds).
26' Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2489.
264 Id. ("We expect that the gulf between physical practicability and digital capacity will only continue to
widen in the future.").
265 Id. at 2490 (referencing United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)). See generally Strutin, Mosaic
Theory: A New Perspective for Human Privacy, supra note 65, at 5.
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embraced is not that far from the concept of linkage that underlies DNA
matching. People are more than just their person, they are their digital data,
and per force, their biological data. The only other information containers
with the "pervasiveness" of cell phones are the cells of the human body.266
Justice Roberts pointed out that the "house" protected by the Fourth
Amendment paled in comparison to the digital archive of information that
exceeds physical contents in both size and nature.26 In fact, the data ac-
cessed through a cell phone might reside in the Cloud, blurring the line be-
tween local and networked data and rendering the source of information in-
distinct, which might create unwarranted bonanzas for law enforcement.2 68
In the physical world, a house is a house. But in the virtual world, it can be
every house, workplace, street, store and school as well as every record,
communication and Internet search conducted by or associated with an in-
dividual. In reference to the Cloud, Justice Roberts pointed out that it was
the potential for accessing volumes of connected data through a device car-
ried on the person that necessitated privacy over investigative interests.
"The possibility that a search might extend well beyond papers and effects
in the physical proximity of an arrestee is yet another reason that the priva-
cy interests here dwarf those in Robinson. 2 69
Even more significant than the information container analysis, the Riley
Court saw two reasons for abnegating warrantless cell phone searches,
namely, past crimes and identification. First, "it is reasonable to expect that
incriminating information will be found on a phone regardless of when the
crime occurred."2 ' On the subject of pretexts, the Court noted that, "It
would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement
officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of
just about any crime could be found on a cell phone."2 1 The same could be
said for DNA sampling that reveals linkage to past crimes and is being gar-
266 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2490.
267 Id. at 2491 ("Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the
most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records
previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a
home in any form-unless the phone is.").
268 Id. ("Such a search would be like finding a key in a suspect's pocket and arguing that it allowed law
enforcement to unlock and search a house.").
269 Id. (emphasis added). And the Court did not have much faith in government protocols to assure pri-
vacy in these circumstances. "[T]he Government proposes that law enforcement agencies "develop pro-
tocols to address" concerns raised by cloud computing. Probably a good idea, but the Founders did not
fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols." Id. (citation omitted).
270 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2492.
271 Id. (finding that the holding in Gant was insufficient to limit the scope of warrantless cell phone
searches).
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nered from of a growing catalog of arrestable offenses. And the identifica-
tion and safety rationales for searching electronic devices were also over-
broad. "This approach would again impose few meaningful constraints on
officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal of infor-
mation, and officers would not always be able to discern in advance what
information would be found where. ' '212 Thus, when it came to smartphones,
warrantless searches for confirming an arrestee's identification or evidence
of past crimes were interdicted; but when it came to an arrestee's DNA
these reasons more than justified the intrusion in spite of the volume of data
potentially revealed.2 3
Finally, the Supreme Court responded to the argument that pre-digital era
approved searches for print materials ought to govern cell phone searches.
But this reasoning fell apart when confronted with the massive volume of
data that could potentially be examined. The discovery of a picture or a
bank statement in someone's pocket did not entitle law enforcement to
search through a digital library for years' worth of such records.2 4 Again,
this would also entail information that no one would likely carry about on
their person in its physical form. Thus, the "analogue test" failed to protect
individual privacy interests when faced with the type and quantity of infor-
mation that existed in the digital environment.
Similarly, genetic information might, in its most limited way, in the non-
coding sections, resemble a physical metric like fingerprints or eye color,
but underneath they contain data that dwarfs the memory sticks of the aver-
age cell phone. DNA, like digital data, is the modern equivalent of the
Domesday Book, an unalterable final survey of everything human. It would
be inconceivable for anyone to carry on their person the physical records of
everything that technology might reveal from an analysis of their genome.
If the Court in Riley found law enforcement protocols insufficient to protect
against overbroad searches of a person's technology (present and future),
why does that reasoning not apply to biological information that can be
even more revealing (present and future)? 27 5
272 Id.
273 Id. By the same rationale, King relied on the fingerprint analogy, which like DNA would confirm
identity as well as reveal links to open or unsolved crimes. However, fingerprints do not hold or connect
to the massive quantities of data contained within and linked to DNA or found in cell phones.
274 Id. at 2493.
271 The Court went on to observe that just as information technology has developed, so too has the
means for obtaining search warrants. "Recent technological advances similar to those discussed here
have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient." Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2493
(citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561- 62, 1572-73 (2013) (noting the impact of expedited
communication technologies, such as email and video conferencing, for search warrant applications)).
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Millions of Americans use smartphone technology. It seemingly warrants
more constitutional attention than the biological information installed in bil-
lions of people.2 6 So it is that the Court has shown its awe of computer-
based information:
Modem cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all
they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans "the priva-
cies of life." The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such
information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the
protection for which the Founders fought. 27 7
A leap forward in technology does not vitiate privacy by an unreasoning
adherence to outmoded, pre-digital thinking. Still, Riley's extended discus-
sion and lauding of cell phone processing capabilities and storage features
contrast with King's lack of reverence for the technology that has opened up
the human genome. 2 8
In their essay, analyzing the direction of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence after Riley, Professors Lamparello and MacLean scrutinized the Su-
preme Court's equation of the cell phone and similar data storage devices
with the constitutionally protected precinct of the "home. "27' The new digi-
tal home fit within the expectation of privacy recognized under Katz, rather
than the exigencies of Chimel.2 1 Computers were a different species of in-
formation container both in terms of the type of information they held and
their volume-their telephony was incidental and insignificant.281 Compara-
tively speaking, courts should view DNA as an information container that
incidentally can serve as an identification metric, a duty that can be ably
served by fingerprints or other physical measurements.
276 See Strutin, DNA and the Double Helix of Constitutional Rights, supra note 4, at 5 ("Internet and
computer technologies are our second skin, the shadows and reflections of our most personal and inti-
mate details. And much of the information they contain parallels the biological computer, except in re-
gards to constitutional privacy. DNA is the most compact and enduring of information media. And tech-
nology now permits a life's tale to be written into the fabric of life."). See generally Castillo, supra note
4; George M. Church et al., Next-Generation Digital Information Storage in DNA, 337 SCIENCE 1628
(2012).
277 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2494-95.
278 In fact, the chief distinction between people and evidence raised by Justice Alito's criticism of Chimel
in his concurring opinion in Riley was mirrored by Justice Scalia's observations in King. Compare Riley,
134 S.Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring) (Chimel was "a case that involved the lawfulness of a search of
the scene of an arrest, not the person of an arrestee."), with Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1985
(2013) ("King was not identified by his association with the sample; rather, the sample was identified by
its association with King."). In each, the scrutiny of Fourth Amendment privacy was seen along a line
that separates a person from their surroundings and linkages.
279 Lamparello, supra note 5, at 3.
28" Lamparello, supra note 5. at 3-4.
281 Lamparello, supra note 5. at 5-6.
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The Riley Court endorsed the idea that a personal digital device, like a
smartphone, was a veritable warehouse of countless varieties of private in-
formation, all the more revealing in the aggregate. 2 2 Indeed, it constituted a
portable library, extending into the Cloud, of an individual's life experienc-
es. Porting around these quanta of information was unknown before the In-
formation Age. Similarly, the treasure trove of data contained in our cells
was equally unheard of before the discovery of DNA forensics a generation
ago. To carry the "home" analogy further, the Court pointed out that no
one's house could contain the sum of data stored in a typical computer-in
other words, printing out the millions of files on the average computer
would raise the average roof.283 Thus, warrantless searches were limited to
the capacity of a person to physically, not digitally, carry information-
pockets, not personal computers.284
Thus, it was the information potential of the cell phone that engendered
the Katz expectation of privacy and warrant requirement. Lamparello and
MacLean intimated that in the light of Riley, "the Government will now be
required to provide a digital-era justification to search the "papers and ef-
fects" that are stored in cell phones. '285 Similarly, there ought to be a DNA-
era justification for comparable searches of the human genome at the custo-
dial stage. The Thus, the Supreme Court should reconsider King and re-
move the guess work of dealing with DNA privacy when scientific advanc-
es will assuredly change the nature and volume of information
discoverable.286
DNA is the house of personhood that eclipses the contents of people,
houses, papers and effects. And as in Riley, it is the "object" or container in
which privacy inheres, not merely the data or contents. 28  Again, the
"home" analogy strengthens the privacy interest, since computers and nu-
clear DNA contain more information than will be found in the home or ever
could be. Thus, if the expectations of millions can define the privacy inter-
est in cell phones, certainly the expectations of billions should decide the
level of privacy in the human genome.288 Lamparello and MacLean also
282 Lamparello, supra note 5. at 6.
283 Lamparello, supra note 5. at 7-8.
284 Lamparello, supra note 5,.at 7-8.
285 Lamparello, supra note 5. at 12.
286 Lamparello, supra note 5. at 12-13. This might also avoid the uncertainty and confusion created by
the Court's Chimel progeny.
287 Lamparello, supra note 5, at 15 ("[T]he Court implicitly recognized that cell phones, to an even
greater degree than private homes, engender privacy protections as objects, and not merely because of
the private data they contain.").
288 Lamparello, supra note 5. at 15-16.
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suggested that Riley might expand the privacy interest in metadata gleaned
from cell towers for tracking locations and movements.289 Similarly, when
technology advances to efficiently collect and catalog shed DNA, biological
tracking data, another kind of privacy interest might be recognized. 290 And
since "Riley is the new Katz," as thoughtfully explained by Lamparello and
MacLean,291 the Supreme Court should take a second look at DNA as data
and people as information containers with rights.
King has become the battleground for biological privacy, identity, inves-
tigation and crime solving. While the Fourth Amendment's language re-
mains imperturbable, its virtues in the digital age speak clear. Riley af-
firmed the privacy of human technologies, i.e., personal digital containers.
And yet, DNA forensics is about converting biologics from human contain-
ers into data. Still, data is data, with human cells containing the most valua-
ble data of all. Indeed, forensic databases and digital data are where cases
are made. But from the Supreme Court's viewpoint, a person composed of
computer chips would have a higher expectation of privacy in themselves
than a natural being made up of genes. Nonetheless, the biological man
ought to be the equivalent of the digital man, at least for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.
CONCLUSION
We are data, within and without, and DNA data has the potential to be
the most powerful information technology for revealing the "privacies of
life." The circumference of human knowledge, in particular self-knowledge,
has exploded since the pre-DNA and pre-digital eras. Further, microscopy
has opened an entirely new path to personal information. Peering at animal-
cules through his ground-breaking microscope, Anton van Leeuwenhoek
could scarcely have imagined the secrets of human life that would be un-
covered by the microbiologists who were to follow in his footsteps.2 92 To-
day, law enforcement is accompanying scientists on a Fantastic Voyage
through the human genome, a journey as long and as invasive as the one
currently being taken through our computer technologies.
289 Lamparello, supra note 5,, at 16.
290 See Robert C. Green & George J. Annas, The Genetic Privacy of Presidential Candidates, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2192, 2192, 2193 (2008); Mike Silvestri, Naturally Shed DNA: The Fourth Amendment
Implications in the Trail of Intimate Information We All Cannot Help But Leave Behind, 41 U. BALT. L.
REv. 165, 184-89 (2011) (arguing for model statute declaring per se reasonable expectation of privacy
in shed DNA). See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Searches and Seizures: Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in Contents of Garbage or Trash Receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998).
291 Lamparello, supra note 5, at 17-19.
292 See generally CLIFFORD DOBELL, ANTONY VAN LEEUWENHOEK AND HIS "LITTLE ANIMALS" (1932).
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DNA might be a pinnacle of identification metrics, but it can only be
viewed through human eyes. From now on, identification will be allied with
a genetic rap sheet. In the DNA involved case, challenging the admissibility
of the sample taken in the stationhouse will categorically raise the difficulty
of defense preparation in the new and cold cases. 293 While the test-on-arrest
law has been sanctioned under the Fourth Amendment, this will not totally
eliminate an accused's decision to refuse, contest the law in its application
or constitutionality under state law, or demand that a search warrant be ob-
tained-albeit risking the consequences of forced extraction.294 Indeed,
criminalizing DNA refusal further complicates the issues by introducing the
bodily intrusion of forcible extraction and a new aggravating crime unrelat-
ed to the arresting offense.295
The defense might raise procedural, forensic and human errors in cases
where DNA is the central proof. Nonetheless, the issue becomes complicat-
ed because it will stretch across at least two separate cases, the original ar-
rest acquiring the DNA and the derivative cold case in which it becomes
proof of guilt. And the information from the DNA match will cast a shadow
over the proceedings of the initial case, separate and apart from its role as
evidence in the cold case. A DNA match is a presumptive forensic analysis,
half science and half police work. As scientific discovery changes the scope
of what DNA can reveal, the Supreme Court might need to revisit its hold-
ing in King as Justice Scalia suggested.
In a world of genetic recidivists, everyone's privacy is diminished. Gen-
eralized probable cause for genetic sampling disengages individualized sus-
picion from the DNA-based case. Moreover, lack of uniformity in state test-
on-arrest laws will make people presumed innocent in one jurisdiction
293 In King I, the court characterized the subsequent use of arrestee DNA in a cold case: "The cause-and-
effect relationship between King's original buccal swab and the court-ordered second buccal swab is not
attenuated in any way. The first buccal swab provided the sole probable cause for King's first-degree
rape grand jury indictment. There was no other evidence linking King to the 2003 unsolved rape. Were
it not for the buccal swab obtained illegally after King's assault arrest, there would be no second DNA
sample which could have been used as evidence in King's trial for the charges enumerated .... The
DNA evidence presented at trial was a fruit of the poisonous tree." King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 581 (Md.
2012). This logic will still hold true for those states that follow the privacy standards of their constitu-
tions that exceed the floor of the Fourth Amendment.
294 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 95 A.D.3d 21, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) ("We cannot agree with the sup-
pression court that, after 10 to 15 minutes of asking a suspect to comply with a court-ordered buccal
swab of which the suspect had no prior knowledge, it is reasonable for the police to taser a nonviolent,
handcuffed, and secured defendant in order to force the suspect into submission."). See generally Ken
Strutin, DNA Sampling: A Challenge to Privacy and Dignity, 247 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2012).
295 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1 (West 2014) (stating refusal to provide "specimens, saliva sam-
ples, or thumb or palm print impressions" is a misdemeanor; and reasonable force can be used to obtain
them).
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equivalent to somebody convicted in another. DNA as identification came
in under the judicial radar riding on the precedential coattails of fingerprint-
ing. But the logic failed when it became clear that DNA profiling created
links to other cases that fingerprints alone could not. 296 The Supreme Court
has already decried the pretext of an arrest to acquire a subject's fingerprints
without probable cause.29 Thus, fingerprinting has remained a metric firm-
ly connected to the instant offense, while genetic sampling is completely
unbridled. Under King, probable cause for a new felony arrest, and hence
genetic sampling, becomes probable cause for a search warrant for genetic
information in a cold case -a dangerous conflation of probable cause
standards. This test-on-arrest philosophy did not rely on an exigency excep-
tion. But it did merge arrest criteria that a crime had been committed with
search warrant standards for contraband or evidence of another crime.298
Since Riley, there is more privacy in the machinery of computers than in
the machinery of people. The Supreme Court's division between privacy in
information technology and in information biologics does not further the
ends of justice.299 Why indeed should an extension of our memory, e.g., the
cell phone, or the extension of our mind, e.g., email and text messaging, or
the movement of our bodies in space, e.g., GPS tracking, receive more pro-
tections under the Fourth Amendment than the contents of our body that
can only been see under a microscope? After all, DNA is the Big Data of
being human.
Molecular biology has compelled the reinterpretation of the body and its
boundaries, leading ultimately to new definitions of identity and privacy.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment should protect the container of genetic infor-
mation at least as much as the container of people, the home. Even more so,
296 See Valerie Ross, Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases Poised to Expand, NOVA
NEXT (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/dna-databases.
297 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). See generally
Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1593-1601 (2012).
298 See, e.g., In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 486, 490-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) This was a
pre-King case in which portions of Minnesota statute authorizing DNA sampling on arrest declared un-
constitutional under federal and state constitutions. "The fact that a judge has determined that the evi-
dence in a case brings a charge against the defendant within reasonable probability does not mean that
the judge has also determined that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a biological specimen taken from the defendant." Id.
299 This philosophy is exemplified by exaltation of procedural due process over actual innocence. See,
e.g., McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1256 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (foreshadow-
ing the consequences of unreasoning adherence to mechanical thinking: "Our system of capital punish-
ment simply does not accurately and consistently determine which defendants most 'deserve' to die."));
Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm, DNA Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/us/2-convicted-in-1983-north-carolina-murder-freed-after-
dna-tests.html? r=0 (A death row inmate and his life term co-defendant were exonerated by DNA test-
ing decades after the Supreme Court rejected their certiorari petition.).
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the protections should extend to all dimensions of location, movement and
time. Human DNA is not trapped in the body but in the biosphere. There is
a matrix of biological and digital data that can all too easily be linked with a
person, without a warrant or authentication. Without these protections, hu-
man cells will become the "royal road" to prison cells.
Man's biological destiny encompasses the future of privacy and person-
hood. People are information containers with rights, data in being, and so
society's expectations of privacy must grow alongside technological innova-
tion and scientific discovery. Indeed, information might travel along new
biological corridors that will transcend the current notions of privacy.0 In
whatever manner our laws evolve, our genetic code will continue to be de-
ciphered anew with keen interest. So it is that the registry of human blue-
prints will be the never-ending battleground of privacy.
... It has been suggested that human behavior, perhaps even memories, might be the product of
'transgenerational epigenetic inheritance." See James Gallagher, 'Memories' Pass Between Generations,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), http:www.bbc.com/news/health-25156510?print=true. And researchers have
just begun exploring the possibility that environmental information can be conveyed through genes. See
Brian G. Dias & Kerry J. Ressler, Parental Olfactory Experience Influences Behavior and Neural Struc-
ture in Subsequent Generations, 17 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 89, 94 (2014).
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